

hopefully, but undoubtedly with nervous anxiety, the courier's return from Querétaro.

The courier, however, bore disappointing news. Under date of January 26, Rosa wrote authorizing the commissioners to sign the treaty on condition that the boundary line was run so as to leave Lower California connected with Sonora by land; that no part of Sonora or Chihuahua should be included in the cession to the United States; that all hostilities should cease, and the invaders should withdraw from the capital immediately on the signature of the treaty; that all government revenues should at once be turned over to Mexico, and all military exactions should cease; and that the commissioners should manage to have advances made at once, on account of the payment to be made by the United States, so as to enable the government to sustain itself.

"The government," so Rosa informed the Mexican representatives, "will never agree to close the negotiations without having here, at Querétaro, under its control, the sum of 300 to 400,000 dollars and a positive assurance of receiving 200,000 dollars every month afterwards, for a period of three months. Without sums as large as these, to enable it to face the difficulties that will arise upon the signature of the treaty, the government is certain to be overturned within a few days. I think it unnecessary to say much to you on this subject. Not I alone, but many impartial men with whom we have discussed the matter, are certain that the government will inevitably succumb to anarchy unless it has at its command, when the treaty of peace is concluded, such adequate and assured resources as will enable it to maintain its authority."¹

On the following day both Peña y Peña and Rosa wrote again, having evidently received later intelligence from the commissioners. The explanations received in regard to the boundary, they said, satisfied them that Sonora and Chihuahua were left intact; and as to the amount of compensation to be paid, they authorized the commissioners to settle that. But they still insisted on the necessity of obtaining immediate cash.

¹ Rosa to Commissioners, Jan. 26, 1848; extract in Roa Bárcena, 604.

"I am now," said Rosa, "drafting the full and final instructions which are to be sent you; but I find myself under the sad necessity of telling you that I shall never sign these instructions unless the government has first been assured of getting the funds referred to. . . . The government sorrowfully resigns itself to making peace in order to avoid greater evils; but these evils will not be avoided if the war of invasion is to be succeeded by civil war, and the present administration is left without means to repress sedition."¹

Trist must have received from Thornton some advance intimation of this intransigent attitude of the Mexican government, for at eleven o'clock at night on the twenty-eighth of January he called at the British legation and declared that he had decided to break off all negotiations and leave the country unless the treaty were signed at once. He told Doyle that he had urged in vain the danger of delay, and he declared that he would only wait "a reasonable time" for the arrival of another courier from Querétaro.

"He then said to me," Doyle reported, "he saw clearly they did not give sufficient credit to what he had so frequently urged, namely, the danger of delay, and he concluded by asking me if I would take upon myself to see the Commissioners, and convey the above Message to them, as he thought my doing so might be the means of inducing them to act at once, as they would place reliance on what I might say to them, respecting the very serious risk they were running."

Doyle saw the commissioners next morning (January 29), but was told they were still without authority from Querétaro to meet Trist's demands, and they begged for more time, "promising to write in such terms to their Government as would ensure a decided answer with the least possible delay." Trist, however, professed himself unwilling to wait. He went through all the forms of stern refusal and professed regret at the frustration of his hopes; but finally said he would send an official note to the commissioners breaking off negotiations, while at the same time Doyle might tell the commissioners confidentially that the note would be

¹ Same to same, Jan. 27, 1848; *ibid.*, 605.

withdrawn if they were ready to sign the treaty on the next Tuesday (the first of February).¹

At the request of the Mexican commissioners Doyle helped matters on by writing a private note to Rosa, the Minister of Relations, to give him a statement of General Scott's intentions. In a recent conversation, said Doyle, Scott had explained the difficulties of his position—the orders he had received from Washington, the notorious fact of his being politically opposed to the administration, and the urgency of some of his officers for a forward movement. General Scott, according to Doyle, had added—

“that hitherto he had been able to delay sending troops into the interior of the Country, but as a fresh reinforcement had now arrived under General Marshall, he should be compelled to do so; unless, as he hinted to me, he might be able to come to another determination, from the fact of a Treaty of Peace having been signed.

“The General further added that much as he should regret being obliged to take such a step, yet his orders were most peremptory to March upon Querétaro, and not to allow the General Government an opportunity of establishing itself in any other point of the Republic. . . . I ought to add that General Scott has hitherto invariably expressed to me his determination to maintain the present Government of this Country against all Revolutionary Movements, and should he take the above step, it will only be in consequence of the strict orders he has already received from his Government.”²

The same courier that bore Doyle's terrifying announcement of Scott's intention to march forthwith to Querétaro in order to disperse the provisional government, also bore an agitated letter from the commissioners. They had not been able, they said, to get Trist to agree to the evacuation

¹ Doyle to Palmerston, Feb. 1, 1848, No. 13; *F. O. MSS.*

² Doyle to Rosa, Jan. 29, 1848; copy enclosed with Doyle's No. 13; *ibid.* The War Department, however, had not given Scott orders to march on Querétaro or to break up the existing government. Marcy's latest instructions were very general. Scott was to occupy the country in order to collect taxes, and “deprive the enemy of the means of organizing further resistance”; but what parts should first be occupied was expressly left to Scott's judgment. —(Marcy to Scott, Dec. 14, 1847; Sen. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 145.) Whether Scott deliberately misstated the facts to Doyle, or whether Doyle misunderstood him, or whether Doyle deliberately misstated the facts to Rosa, it does not seem possible to determine.

of the capital, and the turning over of the public revenues immediately on the signature of the treaty; but the second article of the treaty, providing for a military convention in regard to the cessation of hostilities and the re-establishment of civil administration as soon as the circumstances of military occupation would permit, would, they thought, accomplish the same purpose. They believed that the treaty, while it bore the character of a national misfortune, had certainly nothing dishonorable in it. The government must now definitely decide, for the commissioners were of opinion that Trist could really wait no longer.

“We regret,” they continued, “beyond anything the supreme government can imagine, that matters should have come to this point, and that Mr. Trist's exigencies, which he has never expressed with so much heat, should give rise to unfavorable impressions which we would wish to avoid—all the more because we are impressed by the gravity of this business and the difficulties the supreme government has had in giving us its definite orders. If we do not receive them by Tuesday, or if by some misfortune, which is to be apprehended, letters come from Washington, the negotiation will be broken off according to the statements of Mr. Trist and the English chargé d'affaires.”¹

The commissioners were also, it seems, of opinion that it would be unbecoming (*habian creido que no era decoroso*) to ask for pecuniary assistance before the signature of the treaty, but they had received proposals from bankers to make a loan of as much as three hundred thousand dollars.²

Under this pressure from the Mexican commissioners and the British chargé d'affaires, President Peña y Peña gave way. On the last day of January his Secretary of State instructed the commissioners that they might sign the treaty in the form agreed upon with Trist. To break off negotiations, he explained,

“would involve too seriously the existence of Mexico as a nation, and the government will never take upon itself the terrible responsibility

¹ Couto and others to Rosa, Jan. 29, 1848; extracts in Roa Bárcena, 602.

² *Ibid.*, 606.

of continuing the war in the condition of disorganization in which many of the states find themselves—whether because they have been invaded, or because of the threats of revolution which have appeared in them. . . . These motives; the extreme scantiness of resources to which the government finds itself reduced; the probability that the United States may prove every day more exacting and more exaggerated in their demands; the duty of saving the nationality of Mexico at all costs; the consideration that the treaty, grievous as it is for the republic by reason of the fatal circumstances, does not contain a single condition dishonorable to Mexico; the duty imposed on the government to put an end to the calamities from which the country is suffering, and of checking the projects of annexation to Northern America, which are apparent even in the capital of the republic; these reasons, and many others which the government will in due season expound to the nation, compel His Excellency the provisional President to close the negotiations, by authorizing you, as he does hereby authorize you, to sign the treaty with the least possible burdens upon the country, in view of the melancholy circumstances in which it is situated.”¹

The messenger who left Querétaro on the thirty-first of January bearing this final surrender of the provisional government rode fast; for the hundred and fifty miles to the capital were covered before the close of the next day, and the instructions were in the hands of the Mexican commissioners on the evening of the important Tuesday, the first of February. It may safely be assumed that the commissioners lost no time in notifying Trist of their readiness to sign.

For some reason it was determined that the treaty should not be formally executed in the capital. Doyle wrote to his government that this was the wish of the Mexican commissioners,² and the neighboring town of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the seat of the famous shrine of the Virgin of Guadalupe, whose miraculous image was venerated by all Mexicans, was selected as the most suitable place for the concluding ceremony which, it was hoped, would put an end to the war. The labor of completing and examining the five original copies of the treaty in English and Spanish doubtless absorbed the greater part of Wednesday, the second of Febru-

¹ *Ibid.*, 606.

² Doyle to Palmerston, Feb. 2, 1848, No. 14; *F. O. MSS.*

ary; but late on that afternoon everything was ready, so that at six o'clock the signatures were affixed, and the plenipotentiaries crossed the street from their place of meeting to the great church, to render thanks to the Almighty for the happy termination of their labors.