

the Bishop's Palace. Taylor accordingly made some hostile demonstrations in front of the town until dark that evening, and at the same time made arrangements to place in battery during the night two twenty-four-pound howitzers and a ten-inch mortar, with a view to opening fire on the following day.

Early in the morning of Monday, the twenty-first, a note from General Worth, written the night before, suggested a strong diversion against the eastern end of the town in order to favor his enterprise against the heights on the west. This was exactly in accord with what Taylor had intended, and therefore, leaving a camp-guard of one company from each regiment, the whole of the infantry and artillery of the first division of regulars and the first division of volunteers were sent in the direction of the city, while all of the cavalry (May's dragoons and Wood's regiment of Texans) were directed to the right to support General Worth, if necessary, and to make an impression, if practicable, upon the upper part of the city.

Taylor's first attack was directed upon the Tenería redoubt and the northerly side of the town east of the bridge. It was made by the regulars of Twiggs's division, except the fourth infantry, who were held in support of the battery that was trying (with inadequate weapons) to shell the citadel. The attacking columns entered the first straggling houses and the grove of trees near them under a heavy fire of artillery from the citadel and the redoubt, and of musketry from the earthworks and from the houses on the southerly side of the brook. An assault on the Tenería redoubt was also attempted.

"The combat," wrote one of the Mexican defenders of the redoubt, "began to be terrible. The Americans kneeling, concealing themselves, in every sort of posture; in possession of the ground close to the fort, within pistol shot, and even on the counter-scarp, and covering themselves with anything they found; maintained a lively fire upon our parapets. Others, who had penetrated the grove, fired through the gorge into the interior of the fort and wounded some men from the rear."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Balbontin, *Invasion Americana*, 30.

The men who thus fired into the rear of the Tenería redoubt were a small party under Captain Backus, of the first regular infantry, with a portion of his own and other companies who had gained the yard of the tannery from which the brook took its name, and whence they poured a destructive fire into the work and into one of the tannery buildings in the rear of the redoubt, which was occupied by Mexican troops.

But the American troops, in their advance on the strong northeasterly angle of the town, had sustained so heavy a loss, particularly in officers, that it was thought best to withdraw them, which was done in good order, leaving Backus and his men, however, isolated in their tannery. As the assailants fell back amid loud shouts from the Mexicans, a cavalry force that had been sheltered by the citadel attempted a charge upon the retreating regulars and the body of volunteers that was now advancing; but it was not pushed with the slightest resolution, and inflicted little damage on the American troops. The only force that came in contact with the Americans was a body of about fifty lancers who were quickly repelled.

As the Mexican cavalry fell back, Quitman's brigade of Mississippi and Tennessee volunteers, with three companies of the fourth regular infantry, again advanced directly upon the redoubt, while the first Ohio entered the outlying houses of the city in the rear of that work, about where the regulars had already made their unsuccessful attack. Suffering a most severe loss, the volunteers steadily continued their advance on the Tenería, and after being twice repulsed stormed the work, greatly aided, of course, by the fire of Captain Backus and his men, who occupied the tannery yard. The four pieces of artillery, a considerable supply of ammunition, and three officers, thirty privates, and some muleteers were captured at this point. The struggle for the redoubt had lasted almost incessantly from seven in the morning until noon.

No other advantage was obtained that day by the Americans. An advance into the northern part of the city was

found to be impracticable on account of the barricades near the bridge and the strong protection afforded by the breastworks and houses to the south of the brook; and therefore, after three unsuccessful efforts to carry the Diablo lunette, the day ended, the greater part of the American troops being ordered back to camp at about three in the afternoon, leaving only one battalion of regular infantry and one battalion of the first Kentucky regiment to hold the captured work. During the night some additional strength was given to that position, but intrenching tools were lacking and not much could be done.

The following day, Tuesday, the twenty-second of September, passed without any active operations in the lower part of the city. The citadel and other works continued to fire at parties exposed to their range and upon the Tenería redoubt, which was occupied at midday by Quitman's brigade of volunteers, relieving the guard left in it the preceding night. But the troops were greatly encouraged in the afternoon by seeing the American flag over the Bishop's Palace, indicating its capture by Worth.

During all this time it would seem that Ampudia had kept most of his command concentrated in and about the principal plaza. He now determined upon a still further concentration, involving an abandonment of the two remaining eastern redoubts. This decision was not, perhaps, so absurd as it seemed, for the well-built, flat-roofed houses near the Cathedral, and the tower of the Cathedral itself, were capable of being most effectually defended. About midnight on Tuesday, therefore, the Mexicans evacuated the defences near the lower part of the city. Only one hundred and fifty men were detailed to occupy the streets leading to the Bishop's Palace, and five hundred were left to man the citadel. The remainder of the now disorganized and demoralized force were assembled near the Cathedral.

Early on Wednesday morning Quitman, in command of the troops at Fort Tenería, discovered the abandonment of the defences to the south and west of the point he occupied, and at once reported the fact to General Taylor. Taylor,

in reply, sent Quitman orders to enter the city, covering his men by the houses and walls, and to advance carefully "as far as he might deem prudent." The remainder of the troops, under the orders of General Twiggs, were ordered out as a reserve, with the exception of Wood's regiment of Texas mounted volunteers, who were dismounted and ordered to co-operate with Quitman's brigade.

These troops advanced from house to house, and from square to square, very much as the Texans had advanced through the town of Béxar when they captured it from General Cos in the autumn of 1835, and reached a street but one square in the rear of the principal plaza. Their advance was that of which the sound reached Worth about ten o'clock that morning.

"This advance," Taylor reported, "was conducted vigorously, but with due caution, and, although destructive to the enemy, was attended with a small loss on our part." Nevertheless, Taylor determined to withdraw the troops from the city. His doing so seemed inexplicable; and the only reason he gave was that the men had been on duty all the previous night, and that he wished to concert with General Worth a combined attack upon the city. Quitman, however, was in no danger in holding the position he had gained; but under Taylor's orders Quitman's regiments and the second Texas fell back to the outer works, where they were relieved after nightfall by Hamer's brigade (Kentucky and Ohio).

Very soon after Quitman and his men had thus been withdrawn from the town Taylor received a note from Worth, informing him that, having heard the firing in the lower part of the city, he was about to make an attack at the upper end, as he found it had been evacuated by the enemy to a considerable distance. But Taylor still thought it inexpedient to change his dispositions, and therefore sent orders to Worth to suspend his advance until they could have an interview on the following morning. This note Worth apparently did not receive till after nightfall, when he had gained the houses near the Palacio Municipal.

On Thursday morning, before anything could be done, Taylor received a note from Ampudia proposing to evacuate the city and citadel, taking with him all the *personnel* and *matériel* of war. Taylor at once replied, declining to accede to the proposal and demanding "a complete surrender of the town and garrison, the latter as prisoners of war." Pending the receipt of a reply, he arranged verbally with Ampudia's representatives for a cessation of hostilities until twelve o'clock noon, at which hour he would expect to receive the answer of the Mexican general at General Worth's head-quarters.

Taylor's military reputation would have stood even higher than it did if he had insisted upon his demand for an unconditional surrender, and had announced his intention to move at once upon the enemy's works. Ampudia was, it would seem, in no condition to continue his resistance. But Taylor was willing to negotiate, and a long discussion followed as to the terms of surrender. It was finally agreed that the city and citadel should be evacuated; that the Mexican army, with all their arms and accoutrements and one battery of field artillery, should retire beyond a specified line; that neither party should advance beyond that line for a period of eight weeks, or until the orders or instructions of the two governments could be received; and that the Mexican flag, when struck at the citadel, might be saluted by its own battery.<sup>1</sup>

On Saturday, the twenty-sixth of September, the Mexican army therefore began evacuating the city. They were watched in their march with great interest by the American soldiers.

"The infantry," said a regular officer, "were miserably clad, brawny, thick-set fellows, chiefly shod with sandals; one regiment of Lancers

<sup>1</sup> Taylor's detailed reports of the operations at the easterly end of the town and of the terms of evacuation, with the subreports of his subordinate commanders, will be found in H. R. Doc. 4, 29 Cong., 2 sess., 83-102. Other accounts by eye-witnesses of the very confused fighting at the east end will be found in Grant, I, 110-118; Kenly, *Memoirs of a Maryland Volunteer*, 97-100, 105-120; Giddings, 159-190; Henry, 193-209; Johnston, *Life of Albert Sidney Johnston*, 136-145; Ballbontin, 24-37.

were as fine looking men as I ever saw. Their horses were inferior horses; *one* of ours could ride over *three* of them. The streets were filled with followers of the army, mounted on everything, from a decent mustang to a humble, uncomplaining donkey. Some of the officers' wives, picturesquely wrapped in their gay-colored ponchos, were slowly riding after their chivalric husbands."<sup>1</sup>

A newspaper correspondent described the scene as follows:

"Two regiments of infantry led off, with colors flying, drums beating, and the trumpeters blowing with all their might. The fifers made all the noise they could. The men were all well armed, and the whole division seemed to be well appointed, with the exception of shoes. Three pieces of artillery were in the centre of the column, one six, one nine, and one twelve pounder. The line, marching four abreast, extended about one mile. The army was accompanied by a great many females; officers' wives on horseback, their faces muffled, and with hats on; the soldiers' wives were mounted on donkeys or were on foot, some of them carrying burdens that I would scarcely think of packing on mules."<sup>2</sup>

By Monday morning, the twenty-eighth of September, the evacuation of the city and citadel was complete.

The losses incurred by the two armies were probably approximately equal. In Worth's division there were nine killed and forty-six wounded, a total of fifty-five casualties. In the operations at the east end of the town the American losses were very much greater, being one hundred and eleven killed and three hundred and three wounded, almost all having been incurred on Monday in the operations that resulted in the capture of the Tenería redoubt. The Mexican losses, as usual, were not exactly ascertainable, although, as they fought for the most part behind intrenchments or stone-walls, they may have been less than those of the Americans.

Ampudia, in his official report, dated September 25, 1846, stated that after a brilliant contest, in which the enemy was repulsed with a loss of fifteen hundred men at various points, the Americans had managed to take possession of the com-

<sup>1</sup> Henry, 218.

<sup>2</sup> From George W. Kendall's letters, quoted in Reid, 211.

manding points of the Bishop's Palace and the hills to the south of it, as also of the detached work known as the Tenería, and had pushed their detachment through the houses toward the centre of the city, thus reaching to within half a gunshot of the principal plaza. Under these circumstances he had been requested by various commanders to propose an arrangement. They feared that an attempt on their part to cut a way through the American lines would result in the dispersal of their troops, and that nothing could be saved of their *matériel*. In view of these circumstances, and considering also the danger to the city, the scantiness of his ammunition, and the want of other supplies, he had acceded to proposals which resulted in the agreement of capitulation. By these means, he said, the national honor and that of the army had been saved.<sup>1</sup> He gave no figures either as to the number of troops under his command or the casualties sustained.

The operations which ended in the fall of Monterey were severely criticised from a military point of view, principally on the ground of the rash division of the American force by detaching Worth to attack the western side of the city. Napoleon's maxim, that nothing is so rash or contrary to principle as to make a flank march before an army in position, especially when this army occupies heights at the foot of which you are forced to defile, was quoted against Taylor. He was also criticised for want of caution in making what were called "experimental" attacks upon the eastern end of the city, and for his failure to push his advantage on Wednesday morning, when Quitman advanced through the streets and houses to the neighborhood of the plaza.

These criticisms might have carried greater weight if Taylor had not succeeded in the end; and other military writers have pronounced them without foundation, relying, in great part, upon Taylor's knowledge of the character of the enemy as a justification for dividing his force. Certainly the troops opposed to him had thus far manifested so little enterprise that he might be excused for taking some

<sup>1</sup> Roa Bárcena, *Invasion Norte-Americana*, 57.

liberties with them. They had failed to oppose his advance up the river and his advance from Camargo to Monterey. They made no serious attempt to attack Worth during his flanking movement from the wood of Santo Domingo to the Saltillo road. Their cavalry was relatively numerous, and although it did make some attempts upon the slightly guarded American camp and upon Taylor's troops in their marches between the camp and the city, these attacks were not at any time vigorous. If, therefore, Taylor relied on the want of enterprise of his opponents, the result fully justified his prevision.<sup>1</sup>

Ampudia was also the subject of criticism. His plan of standing strictly on the defensive, it was said, was most advantageous to the Americans. Not only was no attempt ever made to recover points that had been lost, but no sallies were made in aid of partial defences or to aid in repelling attacks. His abandonment of the Diablo and Libertad redoubts on the night of the twenty-second was thought to have been a great mistake; and his dismounting his cavalry and using them as infantry on the roofs of the houses the next day was another blunder, as their short-range carbines were useless in such fighting and the men could have been of far more service outside the town.<sup>2</sup> Ampudia could point to no successes to justify his acts; but he also might, perhaps, if he had been so minded, have offered as an explanation his knowledge of the men composing the two armies.

<sup>1</sup> Reference may be made to Ripley, I, 249-257; Stevens, *Campaigns of the Rio Grande and Mexico*, 26-29; Henry, 185, 201, etc.; Howard, *General Taylor*, 199-204.

<sup>2</sup> Balbontin, *Invasion Americana*, 50.