

Rejón, who had shortly before succeeded Bocanegra as Minister of Foreign Relations, the warlike protests and warnings required in Calhoun's instructions of September 10. These were well calculated to excite Mexican anger.

The President, said Shannon, had learned with deep regret that the Mexican government had announced its determination to renew the war against the republic of Texas, and he protested both against the invasion and also as to the manner in which it was proposed to be conducted. The decree of the provisional President of June 17, 1843, and the orders of General Woll, issued June 20, 1844, had left no doubt upon the latter point. In what spirit these orders would be fulfilled was well illustrated by the fate of the party under General Sentmanat at Tabasco, who "were arrested and executed, without hearing or trial, against the express provision of the Constitution and the sanctity of treaties, which were in vain invoked for their protection."

"Such," continued the United States minister, "is the barbarous mode in which the Government of Mexico has proclaimed to the world it is her intention to conduct the war. And here the inquiry naturally arises, what is her object in renewing, at this time, a war, to be thus conducted, which has been virtually suspended for eight years, and when her resources are known to be so exhausted as to leave her without the means of fulfilling her engagements? But one object can be assigned; and that is, to defeat the annexation of Texas to the United States. She knows full well that the measure is still pending, and that the rejection of the treaty has but postponed it. She knows, that when Congress adjourned it was pending in both Houses, ready to be taken up and acted upon at its next meeting, and that it is at present actively canvassed by the people throughout the Union. She is not ignorant that the decision will, in all probability, be in its favor, unless it should be defeated by some movement exterior to the United States. The projected invasion of Texas by Mexico, at this time, is that movement, and is intended to effect it, either by conquering and subjugating Texas to her power, or by forcing her to withdraw her proposition for annexation, and to form other connexions less acceptable to her.

"The United States cannot, while the measure of annexation is pending, stand quietly by and permit either of these results. It has been a measure of policy long cherished, and deemed indispensable to their safety and welfare, and has accordingly been an object steadily

pursued by all parties, and the acquisition of the territory made the subject of negotiation by almost every administration, for the last twenty years. This policy may be traced to the belief, generally entertained, that Texas was embraced in the cession of Louisiana by France to the United States in 1803, and was improperly surrendered by the treaty of Florida in 1819, connected with the fact that a large portion of the territory lies in the valley of the Mississippi, and is indispensable to the defence of a distant and important frontier. . . .

"The President has fully and deliberately examined the subject, and has come to the conclusion that honor and humanity, as well as the safety and welfare of the United States, forbid it; and he would accordingly be compelled to regard the invasion of Texas by Mexico, while the question of annexation is pending, as highly offensive to the United States. He entertains no doubt that they had the right to invite her to renew the proposition for annexation; and that she, as an independent State, had a right to accept the invitation, without consulting Mexico, or asking her leave. He regards Texas, in every respect, as independent as Mexico, and as competent to transfer the whole or part of her territory as she is to transfer the whole or part of hers. . . .

"Such are the views entertained by the President of the United States in regard to the proposed invasion, while the question of annexation is pending, and of the barbarous and bloody manner in which it is proclaimed it will be conducted; and, in conformity to his instructions, the undersigned hereby solemnly protests against both, as highly injurious and offensive to the United States."¹

Rejón replied in the usual manner, making much of the unlucky phrase that the annexation of Texas had been a cherished measure of American policy for twenty years; but gross as Shannon's indiscretions were, and violent as was the language of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in his reply, the correspondence failed to produce the effect which the Mexican government had hoped for at home. In the United States the tone of the correspondence served only to hasten the annexation measures.

The truth was that by this time the Mexican public had lost confidence in Santa Anna's administration, and was beginning to accuse him of having betrayed the country. It was beginning also to be publicly said that he had threat-

¹ Shannon to Rejón, Oct. 14, 1844; Sen. Doc. 1, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 48-52. Rejón to Shannon, Oct. 31, 1844; H. R. Doc. 19, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 8 *et seq.*

ened the United States with war in case of annexation simply for the criminal purpose of finding, in a foreign war, a plausible pretext for prolonging his dictatorship and squeezing the tax-payers, in order to benefit the private fortunes of his followers and to help along impudent speculators.¹ Obviously the time had come when a revolt was certain to break out, and it was not long delayed.

On October 30, 1844, the departmental assembly of Jalisco began the revolt by sending a petition to Congress in which, after a detailed statement of grounds of complaint, it submitted a proposal for repealing the law of August 21 which imposed the extraordinary tax, and for an amendment of the Constitution "in the respects in which experience has shown that it is contrary to the prosperity of the Departments." Federalism was once more coming into fashion. The garrisons in Jalisco at the same time signed a declaration approving these proposals of the departmental assembly, and inviting General Paredes to put himself at the head of the forces.

Paredes hesitated before taking any decided action, but on the second of November he issued a manifesto to the nation reviewing the history of the revolution which he himself had set on foot in 1841, and which had resulted in the Bases of Tacubaya.² He accused Santa Anna of not having known how to discharge the duties devolved upon him, and asserted that in his hands the army had come to a deplorable condition. The ranks were not filled, the men were not paid, promotions were wrongly made, the widows and families of patriots were in poverty, and yet the military budget had grown to such an exorbitant sum as the nation could not satisfy. The government offices were in the most frightful disorder and confusion. The Treasury was disorganized and bankrupt, and was surrounded by

¹ *México á través de los Siglos*, IV, 523.

² Paredes had in fact been conspiring for some time before, and the government knew it. To get him out of the way, he was appointed governor of Sonora in August, and flattering letters were sent to him from Santa Anna, Rejón, and others. See *El General Paredes y Arrillaga*, 139-207 (García, *Documentos Inéditos*, etc., XXXII).

inexorable creditors, by insatiable speculators, by naked soldiers, and by hungry employees. What had become of the public funds? More than sixty million dollars had been placed at the disposal of General Santa Anna since October 10, 1841, and what had he done with them? It might not be easy to reply to these simple questions, but it was apparent, and was indeed a matter of general attention, that some speculators had acquired sudden fortunes under the shadow of absolute power, and had converted themselves into vampires of the blood of the people.

"The plunder of the property of the nation is carried on with the greatest impudence. The administration of the custom houses and contracts of all kinds have been an abundant mine for the new variety of thieves, who are scattered in bands throughout the whole of the Republic. Hence that accumulation of frauds which have now become a habit and a system—hence that scandalous luxury with which the public poverty is insulted. Although the crimes of the Texan colonists have offended the generosity of Mexicans, the unhappy event at San Jacinto has excited public indignation. Ever since that time, the nation whose honor has been wounded has been willing to make every sacrifice to vindicate the stain upon its honor, and this universal enthusiasm has been a talisman to which recourse has been had to extort from the people heavy taxes and to carry forward ambitious designs. Under the pretext of recovering Texas, Santa Anna extorted from Congress the decree to raise four million dollars as a war subsidy, but that money was spent before it had been collected."

Paredes went on to say that Santa Anna could very well have undertaken the Texan campaign at the end of the year 1842, when the government had ample means for the purpose; but in place of doing so, and thus putting the nation in possession of the rights of which it had been defrauded, he had sent the army to Yucatan, where hundreds of lives and thousands of dollars had been wasted. If the eight thousand soldiers sent against Campeche and Merida had been sent against Texas triumph would have been certain.

"History will say to future generations that in the acts of General Santa Anna there has never been anything great, anything noble, anything becoming; that he has pursued a petty and culpable policy,

and has used wicked and vile methods; that his tortuous progress has been that of a tyrant made insolent by power or infatuated by prosperity; that his base duplicity and his unmeasured ambition do not deserve to be compared with the bold generosity of great rulers; and finally that in everything he has done there is nothing noticeable but a heterogeneous mass of contradictory qualities,—nothing great but his crimes, and even these are made petty by the smallness of his motives, which have merely been to satisfy a general avarice and the inclinations of a pirate.”¹

This declamation need not be accepted as an accurate statement of facts, but it is of value as indicating what was then said, and in some cases believed, by those who were opposed to Santa Anna's government.

For several days the government organs persisted in ignoring the movement in Jalisco, but by November 9 it was officially announced that the supreme government had directed the President to place himself at the head of the troops stationed at Jalapa, and to march to Querétaro, so as to be ready to act according to circumstances; that the President had replied he was glad to comply with the order and to serve the country; and that troops to the number of seven thousand infantry, fifteen hundred cavalry, and twenty pieces of field artillery were on the march. It was also, of course, officially declared that the real purpose of the promoters of the pronunciamiento was to put an obstacle in the way of the Texan war; but it was in vain for Santa Anna any longer to blow his Texan trumpet. His enemies professed to be just as earnest as he for the recovery of the lost territory, but they declared they would not have him as their leader.

On November 12, in the Chamber of Deputies, General Reyes, the Minister of War, was questioned as to the order directing the President to take command of the army, contrary to the provisions of the Constitution, which prohibited his doing so without express authority from Congress. The

¹ *México á través de los Siglos*, IV, 524-525. Santa Anna asserted that Gómez Pedraza, then a senator, was the real author of this document, and he had told Canalizo to arrest him and imprison him in San Juan de Ulúa.—(Santa Anna to Canalizo, Dec. 5, 1844; *Causa Criminal*, App., 9.)

minister, in reply, admitted that he had given the order referred to, and that he had done so because of the high regard which the army had for Santa Anna, and that he was ready to defend his action before a court of impeachment if it was thought contrary to the Constitution. The galleries hooted and hissed the minister, who furiously denounced the conduct of the crowd, asserting that they were instigated by some of the deputies; and order was only restored by going into secret session. On the following day the Minister of War was impeached.

Santa Anna himself reached Mexico a few days later, and tried in vain to come to an agreement with Congress; but Congress did not believe in Santa Anna's good faith and nothing was done. And after two or three days spent in these fruitless efforts, and after issuing a long reply to the manifesto of Paredes, he set out to overtake his army on the march to Querétaro.

On Sunday, November 24, 1844, Santa Anna entered Querétaro, receiving what he regarded as a very cool reception from the inhabitants. He administered an angry rebuke to the ayuntamiento next day for their failure to come out to meet him. But there was worse than disrespect at Querétaro, for the departmental assembly had passed a resolution approving the action taken in Jalisco. On Monday the governor was ordered into Santa Anna's presence and was violently upbraided for allowing the assembly to pass such a resolution. Looking at his watch, the President said to the governor: "It is now 12 o'clock, and if by to-morrow at this time the repeal of the act by the assembly is not here, your Excellency will be deposed and put under arrest, and the deputies will be sent to Perote." The governor tried to defend the assembly, but Santa Anna abruptly turned his back on him and went out of the room.

The people of the town, with quite unexpected spirit, sustained the members of the assembly. There were great popular demonstrations. Balconies were hung with black. Citizens put on mourning. And the members of the assembly, amid shouts and applause, declared that they would

go to Perote, or go to death if need be, rather than make an ignominious retraction. Before this determined opposition Santa Anna quailed, and the order to send the members to Perote was revoked.

But the mischief was done, for the news soon reached Mexico, and the ministers were at once called upon in the Chamber of Deputies for an explanation. The discussion took place in secret session, although a crowd was demanding that the hearing should be public. The ministers at first refused to give any explanation, but finally promised to obtain official information from the President, and Congress declared itself to be in permanent session. Thereupon the ministry took military possession of the palace and refused to allow Congress to sit.¹

The Senate then met at the house of its president and drew up a protest, which the ministers refused to have printed. The members of Congress who could be got together replied by passing a resolution denying the authority of the executive to prevent the meeting of Congress, and declaring that the government measures were destructive of the Organic Bases on which the republic rested, and tended to destroy the present form of government, and that Congress would continue sitting in such place as it might consider suitable. Upon this the ministers were so ill-advised as to issue a decree, dated November 29, suspending the sessions of Congress until public order should be re-established and the executive put in a position to carry on effectively the Texan campaign, for which objects, it was announced, the government had assumed all necessary authority. In a second decree, dated December 2, all authorities and employees of the republic were required to swear obedience to the decree of November 29.²

The ministry at once met with general opposition. The Supreme Court of Justice on December 2 declared that having sworn to obey and cause to be obeyed the Organic Bases of the republic, which the nation had accepted, and

¹ *Mexico á través de los Siglos*, IV, 527.

² Decrees of Nov. 29 and Dec. 2, 1844; *Dublán y Lozano*, IV, 767, 768.

considering that the government had no power to suspend these Bases, they found it legally impossible to comply with the decree, and would continue to discharge their functions in compliance with the Bases referred to. Similar protests were made by other official bodies. The city was filled with alarm and agitation. All classes made sport of the authorities. The box containing Santa Anna's amputated foot was taken from the cemetery and dragged triumphantly through the streets, and his statues in the market-place and at the palace were thrown down.

The agitation against Santa Anna's government spread as fast as the news of the decree of November 29, suspending the sessions of Congress, could reach the rest of the country. On the second of December the garrison of Puebla joined in the revolt. The task of the government was now to maintain itself in the capital, and for this purpose cannon were planted in the streets and patrols were kept moving through the whole city. For two or three days longer a condition of uneasiness prevailed, but at last, on the sixth of December, a battalion pronounced in support of the Congress, and in a moment the whole fabric of the government collapsed. The rest of the troops united in the mutiny, and before night Canalizo was in prison and Herrera, as president of the council, was again called upon by Congress to assume the duties of President.

General Herrera, who thus succeeded to the chief executive post, was about a year older than Santa Anna, and, like him, was a native of Jalapa. Both he and Santa Anna had been officers in the Spanish army, and both had supported the revolt of Iturbide. Herrera had been always Santa Anna's obedient friend and follower, and it is not surprising, therefore, that Santa Anna looked upon Herrera's assumption of power as an act of personal treachery. The circumstances under which he rose to the presidency were, however, something quite outside of Santa Anna's experience, for there had never before been a revolution such as this in the history of independent Mexico. It was not the work of a single military chieftain, but was a general rising of all the govern-

ing classes of the community against the attempt of Santa Anna and his friends to re-establish a dictatorship. In a proper sense it was not a revolution at all, for the leaders of the movement were acting in strict accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Herrera was not one of the leaders. He happened to be in office and was selected by those who really possessed the power as a mere figure-head, and as such he remained; and for the first time in Mexican history the government was really in the hands of a small group of men in Congress who were in a position to insist upon a responsible ministry.

On the evening of the sixth of December a new ministry was created in which Luis G. Cuevas was Minister of Foreign Relations, a post he had filled under Bustamante's government at the time of the war with France. The ministers immediately set to work to obtain from Congress authority to raise a force of volunteers and to incur the necessary expenditure,¹ while at the same time General Bravo, the last survivor of the old revolutionary leaders in the war of independence, was put in command of the city of Mexico, and his name, of itself, gave great weight to Herrera's government.

While these things were happening in the capital Santa Anna was on his way to attack Paredes. He was at Querétaro when the news came of the decree of November 29, closing the sessions of Congress, and from there he wrote to Canalizo and his ministers expressing his delight at their vigorous action. "The protest of the Deputies and Senators," he wrote to Canalizo, "is very ridiculous, and I am sure it will not find an echo anywhere." Energetic dispositions to save the situation and severity for the enemies of the government were what he recommended.²

Two days later he had heard of the mutiny of the troops at Puebla, and he wrote that he could only spare six hundred men from his own forces, but that while the defection of General Inclan, in command at Puebla, was not pleasant it

¹ Law of Dec. 9, 1844; *ibid.*, 769.

² Santa Anna to Canalizo, Dec. 4, 1844; *Causa Criminal*, App., 8.

really did not matter, provided the government acted with skill and firmness. "In short, my friend," he wrote to Canalizo, "resolution, exemplary chastisement for the heads of every conspiracy: don't stop now on the road, since that would be very dangerous at this moment. Weakness and vacillation are dangerous."¹

But at the very moment Santa Anna was sending this advice to the city of Mexico his government was crumbling to pieces, and he received at Silao, four or five days later, the news of the catastrophe. It was perfectly evident that the destruction of Paredes had now become a secondary object, and at once Santa Anna halted his army and returned toward the capital. From Celaya he wrote as follows to Herrera:

"My dear Friend and Companion. I regret extremely that you have so far forgotten what is due to our old friendship, our pleasant relations, and what I think I am entitled to as first magistrate of the Republic, as not to have thought fit to write me to give information of the events which have placed you for the time being at the head of the administration. I do not know what to think of this silence on your part, although indeed I seem to see in it a kind of hostility towards me personally which I do not think I deserve in any view of the case: but I hope I am mistaken in this idea, and that the origin of your silence may be something else.

"But whatever it may be, I am to-day writing to you officially that as I consider myself in complete possession of the rights and privileges which are granted to me by the constitution, I am about to proceed to the capital with the object of taking up the duties of President of the Republic. My honor and my duty impose upon me the obligation of asking you to turn over to me the exercise of the post of chief magistrate, which the nation spontaneously conferred upon me for a period of five years, and I trust that your good judgment will decide in accordance with that which in my opinion reason demands, namely, not to oppose the precepts of the law. . . . I am starting to-morrow for Querétaro and will then proceed to the capital at the head of the army of operations."²

At Querétaro Santa Anna caused explanations of the mutiny at the capital to be circulated. It was the work,

¹ Santa Anna to Canalizo, Dec. 6, 1844; *ibid.*, 18.

² Santa Anna to Herrera, Dec. 18, 1844; *ibid.*, 36.

his official organs asserted, of foreigners, and was paid for by foreign gold. These foreigners (presumably Frenchmen and Americans) were burning with anger at the mere memory of December 5, 1838 (the day Santa Anna lost his leg at Vera Cruz), and were interested in putting an end to the career of the only man who was capable of conducting the war with Texas.¹ At the same time he summoned a meeting of the officers of his army, who duly signed a declaration to the effect that they would support Santa Anna, and would not recognize those who were in power at the city of Mexico; and that they would not lay down their arms until order was re-established and the constitutional authority of the President was acknowledged and obeyed by all.²

By this time, however, Santa Anna's enemies at the capital were busy with his impeachment. On December 6 he had been formally accused "of having attacked the constitutional system established by the Bases of Organization of the Republic by dissolving the departmental assembly of Querétaro, by arresting its members, and by suspending the governor of that department." To this was subsequently added the charge of co-operating in preparing the decree of November 29, and of endeavoring thereby to destroy the constitutional government of the republic. On December 10 the two houses of Congress met and formally declared that, having considered the accusation and certain documents which were in evidence in the case of General Canalizo, testimony should be taken in regard to the acts of which the President was accused.

All this was in strict accordance with the Constitution. By Article 90 of that instrument the President might be proceeded against criminally for treason against the national independence and the form of government established by the Constitution. The two houses of Congress in joint session were, in such a case, to constitute a grand jury, whose business it was to examine the charges and to formulate

¹ *México á través de los Siglos*, IV, 531.

² *Acta de la junta militar celebrada en Querétaro*, Dec. 20, 1844; *Causa Criminal*, App., 46-56.

an indictment which was to be heard before the Supreme Court of the nation.¹

Santa Anna, with his army, reached the suburbs of Mexico on Christmas Day, but he could not bring himself to the point of attacking the city. The fact probably was that he thoroughly distrusted his own officers. "You know," he had written to Canalizo on December 6, "the kind of little officers (*oficialitos*) we have, whom you have to keep under your eye all the time."² He therefore only paused for a day or two, and by the first of January, 1845, he had arrived, with his division, in front of Puebla, and exchanged shots with the forts. For the next ten days some desultory firing was kept up, but reinforcements for the garrison began to come in from the city of Mexico and Santa Anna saw that the game was up. He offered to resign the presidency if he could have permission to retire to a foreign country with full pay and restoration of his statues and portraits, but the new government refused to entertain any terms short of unconditional surrender.

Santa Anna's men were by this time demoralized and many were deserting, and he finally advised them to submit, and started for the coast with an escort of seven or eight hundred cavalry. His little remaining force was, however, intercepted by the garrison at Jalapa and Santa Anna left them. With only four men he attempted to make his way through by-paths to the coast, but he was arrested by some volunteers at the village of Jico, on January 15, and was carried the next day to Jalapa, where he was kept for four days in prison, *incomunicado*, and then sent to the castle of Perote.

The Congressional party had now completely triumphed in all parts of the republic and the impeachment proceedings were pressed. Santa Anna's answer to the charges against him was taken, and on February 24 the two houses of Congress, sitting as a grand jury, formulated and adopted the indictment against him by a vote of 90 to 7.³ For the next

¹ *Dublán y Lozano*, IV, 435-440.

³ *Ibid.*, 105.

² *Causa Criminal*, App., 17.

three months the slow procedure of the Mexican courts continued. Santa Anna was examined in his prison at great length, but finally, on May 24, 1845, Congress passed a law of amnesty, by which all persons charged with political crimes were granted a pardon, with the exception of Santa Anna, Canalizo, and the ministers. As to Santa Anna, it was provided that the proceedings against him should be terminated provided he would leave the national territory within a period to be fixed by the government, in which case his resignation as President of the republic would be accepted.¹ Santa Anna made haste to accept the terms offered, and on June 3 he embarked with a young wife, whom he had recently married, and took up his residence in Havana.

¹ Dublan y Lozano, V, 18.

CHAPTER XXVI

CONGRESS INVITES TEXAS TO ENTER THE UNION

WE have seen that President Houston and his advisers early in the year 1844 had been reluctantly induced, under the strong pressure of public opinion, to enter into negotiations for a treaty of annexation. How far they expected or wished for success in these negotiations was uncertain, and in particular Houston's personal attitude at this time has always been an enigma. But it may fairly be said that the President of Texas and his cabinet remained at least lukewarm while the subject of the treaty was before the government and people of the United States.

A week before the treaty was actually signed the British chargé d'affaires reported Houston as very much embarrassed, but still firm in his desire for independence, and as demanding such terms from the United States as it could not possibly grant.¹ On the day following the date of this letter the American chargé was writing to Washington very much to the same effect. Houston, he said, had received letters from Van Zandt, and had written to the Texan representatives in Washington not to move in the negotiation unless such pledges and assurances as Murphy had given were again renewed by the American government.²

Nevertheless, when the treaty actually reached him, Houston was not displeased. To Van Zandt and Henderson he wrote that Calhoun's assurances of protection did not "embrace the guarantee as fully as was contemplated." Still, he thought the treaty well enough, but he was clearly convinced that this was the last effort that Texas would ever make, and if it failed he did not believe that any solici-

¹ Elliot to Aberdeen, April 7, 1844; E. D. Adams, 161.

² Murphy to Tyler, April 8, 1844; *State Dept. MSS.*