

tion alone, produced the nomination of Mr. Polk. It was that upon which the Presidency hung, first in the nominating convention, and then at the ballot-boxes, where the people ratified the act of the convention. This is the precise truth, to deny which is both dishonest and unwise."¹

But if Clay's defeat was thus due to the anti-slavery spirit of a minority, Polk's support can hardly be said to have been due solely to slavery. It was rather due to the Western spirit of expansion, which was unwilling to put bounds to the growth of the nation, and therefore welcomed annexation. The slave states were by no means unfriendly to Clay. Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, Kentucky, and Tennessee together gave 286,278 votes for him, as against 277,615 for Polk; and in the electoral college the votes from these states stood, 44 for Clay and 27 for Polk. South Carolina, which was dominated by Calhoun, was in an exceptional position. Her nine electors were chosen by her legislature; but if she had held a popular presidential election there would probably have been nearly 50,000 majority for the Democratic candidates.²

On the other hand, all the Western and Southwestern states, with the single exception of Ohio, were for Polk. Ohio gave Clay 5,940 plurality, but Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, Arkansas, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana together gave Polk a plurality of over 50,000.³ The total popular vote was 1,337,243 for Polk, 1,299,062 for Clay, and 62,300 for Birney. Adding the estimated vote of South Carolina, it may be said that Polk received about 90,000 more votes than Clay and 30,000 more than Clay and Birney combined.

The results of the congressional elections were even more decisive in favor of the Democrats than the result of the presidential election. The new House of Representatives stood about 120 Democrats to 72 Whigs.⁴

¹ Barnes, *Life of Thurlow Weed*, II, 124.

² Pickens to Calhoun, Nov. 6, 1844; *Amer. Hist. Assn. Rep.*, 1899, II, 990.

³ 283,423 for Polk 232,860 for Clay. See Stanwood's *History of the Presidency*, 223.

⁴ Vote for Speaker when the 29th Congress organized.

CHAPTER XXV

THE BANISHMENT OF SANTA ANNA

DURING the period when the terms of the Texan treaty of annexation were under discussion and the presidential election in the United States was in progress Mexico was enjoying an interval of quite unusual tranquillity. The chronic revolution in Yucatan was for the time being at an end, and, notwithstanding the urgency of Almonte's appeals for an invasion of Texas, not a Mexican soldier crossed the frontier. But the political barometer was steadily falling.

The ominous calm which prevailed was, for the first six months of the year, in part the effect and in part the cause of Santa Anna's prolonged absence from the capital. Following his usual custom, he had gone to Manga de Clavo in the autumn of 1843, before Congress met, and he did not return until the following month of June. He had been duly elected President in the meantime, in spite of a sullen and growing opposition, for no one else had yet shown himself strong enough to take and hold the place.

The government during these months was intrusted to the incapable hands of General Canalizo, who managed to preserve order, in spite of the menacing aspect of foreign affairs on the north and a chronically empty Treasury at home. Tornel continued as Minister of War and Bocanegra as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and they brought at least a considerable experience into the cabinet of the President *ad interim*. But the dictatorship of Santa Anna during the previous two years and a half had made him and all about him excessively unpopular. The extraordinary ostentation he had introduced gave rise to the most injurious suspicions of corruption, which extended to all his intimate friends;

and the government, being looked upon in Congress with the greatest distrust, was not able to get anything done.

There was some evidence, as the American minister reported, of a disposition to resist, and to put an end to the absolute dictatorship which Santa Anna had so long exercised; but if this spirit were to be persisted in he would come up from Jalapa with nearly the whole of the army and dissolve Congress. "He is very far from being popular, but is feared by all. His great security consists in the divisions amongst those opposed to him, and their want of a leader who could command general confidence. The army is in his interest and so are the clergy generally." But the difficulty, as Thompson saw it, was that Santa Anna could not keep the army unless he paid them; and he could not pay the army unless he took church property, and he thus stood to lose either the church or the army.¹

In March, 1844, came the news that Houston had rejected the terms of the proposed armistice, and that he was bargaining with the United States for the annexation of Texas; and shortly afterward it was announced that the treaty had actually been signed and sent by President Tyler to the American Senate. It will be remembered that this information was officially conveyed through the American chargé d'affaires in Mexico, and that he had been instructed to give the Mexican government the strongest assurances that the United States had not been actuated by any feelings of disrespect or indifference to the honor or dignity of Mexico.²

The messenger who bore this important communication, Colonel Gilbert L. Thompson, reached Vera Cruz about the fourteenth of May, and on his way to the capital called on Santa Anna and told him the news, and perhaps suggested, under orders from Calhoun, some pecuniary compensation to be offset against the claims of American citizens. Santa Anna must have felt that Calhoun's instructions merely added insult to injury; but with his habitual self-command, he only said that Mexico was resolved to maintain its rights

¹ Thompson to Upshur, Feb. 2, 1844; *State Dept. MSS.*

² Calhoun to Green, April 19, 1844; H. R. Doc. 271, 28 Cong., 1 sess., 54.

over its revolted territory, and could not, therefore, enter into any agreement on the subject.¹ He had, in fact, already taken certain steps in view of this new turn of affairs; for he had seen in the signing of the treaty of annexation an opportunity to regain his waning popularity. On May 12 the unpopular Tornel was dismissed from the War Office and General Reyes was put in his place.² The next day Canalizo issued a proclamation summoning a special session of Congress for the first of June, "to receive the oath of the Constitutional President, who is about to enter on the discharge of his duties," to authorize an increase of the army, and to grant supplies for the recovery of Texas.³

Having thus prepared for his reception, Santa Anna in due time set out from his hacienda, and made a formal entry into the capital under triumphal arches on the evening of June 3. On the next day he appeared before Congress and took the constitutional oath of office as President of the republic.

In the meantime Green, the American chargé, had conveyed the official information of the action of the United States by means of a note to the Foreign Office, in which he repeated, almost word for word, the language of Calhoun's instructions. Bocanegra, in reply, expressed his astonishment that the United States should have signed a treaty despoiling Mexico of "a Department which, by ownership and possession, belongs to her." Such an event, he declared, must lead to the most serious consequences. Mexico was entitled to satisfaction for the atrocious injury which was done to Mexico by the mere signature of the treaty; but she flattered herself with the hope that the Senate of a free and enlightened nation, founded by the immortal Washington, would not constitutionally consummate an act which reason, right, and justice condemned. If, unfortunately, contrary to this hope, the treaty should be approved, Mexico

¹ *México á través de los Siglos*, IV, 515; J. H. Smith's *Annexation of Texas*, 289-293.

² C. M. Bustamante says that Santa Anna thought Tornel was getting too rich.—(*Apuntes para la Historia de Santa Anna*, 250.)

³ *Dublan y Lozano*, IV, 758.

would consider herself placed in such a position that she ought to act in accordance with the law of nations and her reiterated protests. And the minister went on to discourse at great length upon the wickedness of the United States government.¹ Green sent a rejoinder to Bocanegra, defending the course of his government, and Bocanegra replied to Green, and for six weeks an angry correspondence continued which was published in the government newspaper, but which led, and could lead, nowhere.²

The real purpose of the Mexican Foreign Office in all this exchange of notes was obviously to fire the Mexican heart, and thereby to induce an unwilling Congress to vote money for the army, for money was every day harder and harder to come by. Accordingly, on June 10, 1844, as soon as possible after the ceremonies attending Santa Anna's inauguration and the opening of the special session of Congress, General Reyes, the new Minister of War, appeared before the Chamber of Deputies. It was necessary, he declared, to undertake a campaign in Texas without the loss of a moment. If the United States Senate should approve the annexation treaty, war could not be avoided, and the Mexican government believed that even should the treaty not be ratified war would only be postponed for a short time. What was needed in order to enable the government to act in an effective manner was an abundance of military supplies and an abundance of men and money.

"The ordinary expenses of the government," said the Minister of War, "cannot be met at the present time by the ordinary receipts, so that a large deficiency exists. I confidently believe that in order to begin the campaign and to move the army to the territory which is to be recovered, four million dollars will be barely sufficient; and for the present the government limits itself to this sum and gives assurances that it can begin operations immediately. . . . The government also thinks it urgent that the contingent of men from the departments be increased by thirty thousand. . . . The government does not desire extraordinary powers. It restricts itself to those

¹ Green to Bocanegra, May 23, 1844; Bocanegra to Green, May 30, 1844; Sen. Doc. 1, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 52-57.
² *Ibid.*, 58-89.

which are conceded to it by the constitutional bases. It goes further, and asserts that if, through zeal such as has in other times animated legislators, it is granted these ample powers, it will undoubtedly refuse them because it desires that its course of conduct shall be pure, that it shall not be censured for desiring any personal advantages in the affairs of the nation, and that it may be in all things sublime and heroic. Save then the country. Save the law. Save principles. Such is the fundamental idea which dominates the President."

Writing to Calhoun, Green explained that the course of the Mexican government was based upon its confidence that the annexation treaty would be rejected by the United States Senate, and that for this reason the government had assumed "a lofty and war-like tone, expecting to strengthen its popularity by making the Mexican people believe that the failure of the treaty was owing to its firmness and threats."¹

In addition to appealing to Congress for money and men, the Mexican government made further preparation for the proposed campaign by issuing an order to General Woll, then in command at Matamoros, which instructed him as to the course he was to pursue in regard to the inhabitants of Texas. Any person who might be found at a distance of one league from the left bank of the Rio Grande was to be regarded as a traitor to his country, and after a summary military trial was to be shot; and persons who might "be rash enough to fly at the sight of any force belonging to the Supreme Government" were to be pursued until taken or put to death.²

Green at once called to see Bocanegra upon the subject of this sanguinary order, and told him that he hoped it would not be put in force against any citizen of the United States, to which Bocanegra replied that the order applied only to Mexican citizens.³ In Bocanegra's mind Texans were of course Mexican citizens.

There was no need of a proclamation calling for the shoot-

¹ Green to Calhoun, June 7, 1844; Sen. Doc. 1, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 57.

² The orders to Woll were printed in the *Diario de Gobierno* of June 13, 1844. Woll issued a proclamation in accordance with these orders, dated Mier, June 20, 1844.

³ Green to Calhoun, June 15, 1844; Sen. Doc. 1, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 60.

ing of foreigners who might be captured, because that particular feature of the war was covered by the decree of June 17, 1843, already mentioned, which directed that in future no quarter should be granted to any foreigner who invaded the territory of the republic, "whether he be accompanied in his enterprise by a few or by many adventurers, . . . and all such persons, taken with arms in their hands, shall be immediately put to death."¹

The fact that this latter decree was in full force was made very apparent within a few days after the interview between Green and Bocanegra by the shooting of a number of French and Spanish subjects who had landed in the state of Tabasco on the seventh of June, under the command of a Cuban adventurer, one Don Francisco Sentmanat, and who were captured next day by a government force under General Pedro Ampudia. Sentmanat, who had himself been governor of Tabasco, but had had disagreements with Ampudia the year before, had been banished. When captured, he told a very improbable story. He had sailed from New Orleans, he said, in an American schooner for Honduras, with a number of persons who meant to found a colony. They had had no intention of landing in Mexico, but had been driven out of their course by contrary winds and stranded near Tabasco bar. He did not explain why his men were armed or why they opened fire on the Mexican troops who captured them.

Ampudia regarded this invention as only an aggravation of the original offence, and without any form of trial at once executed his prisoner.

"Being convinced therefore," he said in his official report, "that I was now bound to proceed according to the letter and spirit of the decree of June 17, 1843, I granted him the necessary time to make his will and to receive the spiritual aids of religion, and then had him shot according to the requirements of the law. . . . After the corpse had been placed for a few moments in consecrated ground, I directed that it be taken to San Juan Bautista in order that it might be exposed as a public spectacle, showing the just punishment by which society

¹ *Ibid.*, 34.

had purged itself of a scoundrel who had made open war against it, and in order that the people might be satisfied that the object of its terrors and the cause of its disquiet no longer existed."¹

Within the next four or five days Ampudia shot thirty-eight prisoners out of fifty-three whom he had taken; but the most shocking feature of these acts of punishment, against which the ministers of England, France, Spain, and Prussia protested, was the fact that after the corpse of Sentmanat had remained exposed to public gaze for twelve hours his head was cut off and boiled in oil, and then shown in a glass jar in a public place.

The Spanish and French ministers also protested against the shooting of the other prisoners, which they asserted was not within the provisions of the decree of June 17, 1843, as the evidence showed no intention to invade Mexican territory, and that a regular trial would have established the fact. Out of the thirty-eight men shot by Ampudia in Tabasco sixteen were Spaniards and eleven Frenchmen, and the Mexican government was thus deprived of foreign sympathy and support which might have been of value.

The support and sympathy of the Mexican Congress were however, what the government most needed; but that body proved to be in no hurry to pass any law imposing new burdens on the people. It was rumored that Congress would have been willing to grant the President "extraordinary powers," but this would have placed the odium of oppressive war measures upon Santa Anna; and he insisted that he would accept nothing but what was constitutionally voted by Congress. A report from the committee to whom the matter had been referred bitterly criticised the government for asking additional supplies, and asserted that the ordinary revenues would have sufficed for the proposed extraordinary expenses if they had only been managed faithfully and economically. The members of the committee did not say so, but they probably believed the common talk in Mexico, namely, that Santa Anna did not really want the money

¹ *México á través de los Siglos*, IV, 519.

which he had asked for in order to make war upon Texas, but solely in order to forward his own ambitious purposes at home, and that his eagerness in respect to Texas was merely an excuse for carrying into effect his favorite measure—the increase of the army.¹

On June 23, the report of the committee was discussed in the Chamber of Deputies, and the government used its whole influence to have the report voted down, asserting that the measure which the committee recommended would render it impossible to carry on the Texan campaign effectively, and would even prevent the maintenance of the existing military force. Various alternatives were proposed, but a project of law for imposing an extraordinary tax was finally passed and sent to the Senate on the thirteenth of July. In the Senate the proposed measure was disapproved, and an amended bill passed on July 29. By this time the newspapers had taken the matter up. The government organs angrily charged Congress with a want of patriotism in dealing so slowly with the urgent subject of supplies for the Texan campaign; whereupon the opposition newspapers asked whether the government wanted a Congress which did *not* talk, but which took orders from the editor of the *Diario del Gobierno*. The *Diario* replied that this was treason, and at once both houses protested against the articles in the *Diario*, and declaimed against any attacks on the freedom of the press. The ministry energetically sustained the government organ. Although, it was said, Congress had pretended to read with indignation and regret the articles of which complaint was made, nothing had been done except to prove the truth of their assertions; and, indeed, the controversy over the *Diario's* attacks had effectually diverted attention from the real business in hand, the raising of money. The opposition leaders industriously replied to the ministry and kept up the exciting topic; and it may be said that the debate over the newspapers marked the final break between Congress and Santa Anna's government. Nevertheless, the raising of money could not be

¹ Green to Calhoun, June 15, 1844; Sen. Doc. 1, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 61.

absolutely refused, and a bill for a special tax (*impuesto extraordinario*) was finally passed on August 21, after Congress had been almost three months in session.¹ The success of Santa Anna was to cost him dear; for the imposition of the severe special taxes excited the enmity of the people, who were becoming tired of paying for the support of a government that was getting to be detested.²

Santa Anna and his ministers, in urging Congress to grant supplies, entertained sanguine hopes of material aid from England.³ Thus when Waddy Thompson, on his way back to the United States, called at Manga de Clavo to take leave, Santa Anna said that Bankhead, the new British minister, had assured him that in the event of Texan annexation "England would have a hand in the matter."⁴ This was probably a misrepresentation, for Bankhead's official statements were quite different, and when the news of the annexation treaty reached Mexico, and he was asked by Bocanegra whether England would give aid to prevent annexation, he declined to give any explicit promise.⁵ So also after Santa Anna came to the city of Mexico, and before the opposition of Congress had fully developed, he himself told Bankhead that rapid preparations were making to reconquer Texas, and asked what position Great Britain would take if the invasion of Texas should lead to war with the United States, but Bankhead again refused to commit his government.⁶

The British government, however, was at that moment considering more active measures than Bankhead knew of. On May 29, 1844, Lord Aberdeen had an interview with Tomás Murphy, the Mexican chargé d'affaires in London, in the course of which the annexation treaty was discussed. Murphy said that Mexico would never tolerate this outrage on her rights; to which Aberdeen answered that if Mexico would acknowledge the independence of Texas, Great Britain, and probably France, would oppose annexation to

¹ Dublan y Lozano, IV, 760.

² See Chapter XXXI, Vol. II.

³ Thompson to Upshur, March 25, 1844; *State Dept. MSS.*

⁴ Bankhead to Aberdeen, May 30, 1844; E. D. Adams, 176.

⁵ Bankhead to Aberdeen, June 29, 1844; *ibid.*, 177.

⁶ Rivera, *Historia de Jalapa*, III, 619.

the United States, and he would endeavor to arrange a joint guarantee of Texan independence as well as of the boundaries of Mexico. He even went so far as to say that, "provided England and France were perfectly agreed," England would go to the last extremity to prevent annexation.¹ Following this interview, on May 31, Aberdeen invited the French government to join in offering to guarantee that the independence of Texas, if acknowledged by Mexico, "shall be respected by other Nations, and that the Mexico-Texian boundary shall be secured from further encroachment"; and he then informed Bankhead of what was proposed.²

When a copy of Murphy's memorandum of May 29 in reference to his conversation with Aberdeen, and Aberdeen's instructions in reference to it, reached Mexico, Congress had not yet passed the special tax law, and Santa Anna was eager to impart the news. "I shall send this communication to Congress," he was quoted as saying, "show them that England will stand by us, and they must now give the money. . . . The English government say we must either conquer Texas or grant its independence—what will Congress say to that!" But though Bankhead finally prevailed on the Mexican government not to submit the memorandum to Congress, he could not find out what course the government would ultimately take. He did not believe that Santa Anna was sincere in his declared intention to invade Texas, and he also believed, like most other people, that if the money were raised the greater part of it would go into Santa Anna's pockets.³

However, by the end of October, as difficulties began to thicken in Santa Anna's path, the ministers showed themselves inclined to consider seriously the British plan of a joint guarantee. Bankhead wrote that he had secured their practical acquiescence, and a month later he sent a memorandum, drawn up with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, of "points on the settlement of which the Mexican Govern-

¹ *Memorandum of Conversation, etc.; ibid.*, 168.

² Aberdeen to Bankhead, June 3, 1844; *ibid.*, 171.

³ Bankhead to Aberdeen, Aug. 29, 1844; *ibid.*, 184.

ment might agree to grant the independence of Texas."¹ It came too late. Long before this reached London, both the British and French governments had agreed to drop the plan of a joint guarantee, and Bankhead was instructed to point out clearly to Bocanegra that if Mexico "were to take the rash step of invading Texas with a view to its forcible reconquest," she must not look to Great Britain to help her out. Again Aberdeen wrote that the mere existence of a plan to make war on Texas defeated in advance the purpose of the Anglo-French combination; and hence the combination was at an end.² The Mexican hope of possible help from European countries was thus disappointed; but the government did not wholly give it up, and returned later to the plan of recognizing Texas in order to prevent the alternative of annexation.

During all this time the government of the United States was by no means an uninterested spectator of the course of events in Mexico. In June, immediately after the adjournment of the American Congress, Calhoun, in a very unamiable temper, took up the subject of Mexican relations. He had indeed much cause for annoyance. The Texan treaty was defeated. He himself had not got the nomination for the Presidency. And he had made no success, so far, in his conduct of foreign affairs.

Some weeks before this Thompson, who was a regular Whig, and had determined to support Clay, had resigned his place as minister to Mexico, and the appointment was offered to Wilson Shannon, an Ohio lawyer of middle-age, who had been twice elected governor of his state, but who was otherwise without distinction. He had been confirmed by the Senate shortly before its adjournment.

In giving him instructions upon his departure Calhoun dwelt upon various causes of complaint against Mexico. The failure to pay the instalment due under the Claims Convention was, he declared, a violation of national faith, injurious alike to the honor of Mexico and the interests of the

¹ Bankhead to Aberdeen, Oct. 30 and Nov. 29, 1844; *ibid.*, 187, 188.

² Aberdeen to Bankhead, Sept. 30 and Oct. 23, 1844; *ibid.*, 186.

United States. Certain recent decrees of Mexico, prohibiting foreigners from residing in the border states, from engaging in retail trade, and from having in their possession imported merchandise for more than a year, were all (as they affected American citizens) infringements of the treaty of commerce of 1831. With regard to the Texas treaty, the United States government could not permit itself to be drawn into a controversy.

"We hold Texas to be independent, *de jure* as well as *de facto*; and as competent, in every respect, to enter into a treaty of cession, or any other, as Mexico herself, or any other independent Power; and that, in entering into the treaty of annexation with her, we violated no prior engagement or stipulation with Mexico. We would, indeed, have been glad, in doing so, to have acted with the concurrence of Mexico . . . because, in our desire to preserve the most friendly relations with Mexico, we were disposed to treat her with respect, however unfounded we believed her claim to Texas to be. . . . You will also state that you are instructed to pass over unnoticed the menaces and offensive language which the Government of Mexico has thought proper to use. . . . The Government of the United States is too mindful of what is due to its own self-respect and dignity, to be driven, by any provocation, however unwarranted or great, from that decorum of language which ought ever to be observed in the official correspondence of independent States. In their estimation, a good cause needs no such support, and a bad one cannot be strengthened by it."¹

At the same time Texas was watching the warlike preparations of Mexico with anxiety and uneasiness. General Woll had sent to President Houston a formal declaration of war, dated June 19, 1844, stating that the President of Mexico had directed that hostilities be renewed, and declaring that "the civilized world will become the judge of our rights, while victory will crown the efforts of those who fearlessly wage the battle for their country, opposed to usurpation"—a curiously ambiguous phrase.² But it was not until the month of August that information began to reach the Texan government that troops were really assembling with a view

¹ Calhoun to Shannon, June 20, 1844; Sen. Doc. 1, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 23.

² *Ibid.*, 26.

to marching on San Antonio. The Texan Secretary of State therefore wrote to Howard, the United States chargé d'affaires, requesting that the necessary steps be taken to cause the assurances of the American government to be carried into effect by extending military aid to Texas. Howard at once replied that the American government had not agreed "to interpose by affording military aid to Texas in the present emergency," such promises as were made being limited to the constitutional power of the President while the treaty was before the Senate.¹

This very unwarlike reply did not at all suit Calhoun, who wrote to Howard, the moment he learned of the correspondence, that while the President could not make war on Mexico without the authority of Congress, he could and would make suitable representations to the Mexican government against the renewal of the war in the savage manner in which it was proposed to conduct it, and he added that when Congress met the President would recommend the adoption of measures to protect Texas effectually pending the question of annexation.² Calhoun, who always had his own peculiar views as to the meaning of the Constitution, told the Texan representative in Washington that he had at first drafted instructions to Howard which went even further, but that the gentlemen at the head of the War and Navy Departments wished to have some of his promises as to the use of the army and navy omitted.³

Instructions were sent at the same time to Shannon, directing him to present to the government of Mexico a serious protest and warning. There could no longer be any doubt, said Calhoun, that Mexico intended to renew the war against Texas on a large scale, and to carry it on with more than savage ferocity; and there was no doubt that the object of renewing the war was to defeat the annexation of Texas to the American Union. The United States could not stand by and permit Texas to be desolated, or to be

¹ Jones to Howard; Howard to Jones, Aug. 6, 1844; *ibid.*, 25-28.

² Calhoun to Howard, Sept. 10, 1844; *ibid.*, 38. Howard had died in Texas Aug. 16, 1844, although Calhoun did not hear of it until Sept. 15.

³ Raymond to Jones, Sept. 13, 1844; Jones, 382.

forced into a "foreign and unnatural alliance." The President would therefore be compelled to regard the invasion of Texas by Mexico, while the question of annexation was pending, as highly offensive to the United States, whose honor and welfare and safety could not permit such an attack. Moreover, the voice of humanity cried aloud against the manner of conducting the war.¹

A week later another step was taken in aid of Texas. Orders were sent to the commanding officers of the army in the Southwest directing them to restrain all hostilities and incursions on the part of the Indian nations living within the United States; and they were informed that, if after consultation with the Texan authorities it was deemed advisable to occupy points within the limits of Texas in order to prevent Indian hostilities, this might be done. At the same time A. J. Donelson, a nephew, and formerly the private secretary, of President Jackson, was appointed chargé d'affaires to Texas.²

But while the United States and Texas were thus making what preparations they could to meet the threatened danger, the warlike clouds in Mexico had altogether dissipated. The act passed by the Mexican Congress on August 21, 1844, was very far from providing any such sum of money as would have been needed to enable Santa Anna to undertake a vigorous campaign. He had been in fact disappointed in not receiving the enthusiastic and vigorous support from Congress on which he had counted, and he felt that his surroundings in the city of Mexico were daily becoming more and more hostile. The death of his wife on the twenty-third of August gave him an opportune excuse for withdrawing from the scene of his defeat. He therefore obtained permission from Congress on September 7 to retire to the country, and his faithful Canalizo was again appointed President *ad interim*. Canalizo, however, was absent at the time from the city, as he had been intrusted

¹ Calhoun to Shannon, Sept. 10, 1844; Sen. Doc. 1, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 29.

² Adjutant-General to Taylor; same to Arbuckle; Calhoun to Donelson, Sept. 17, 1844; *ibid.*, 37, 38. See also private letter of Calhoun to Donelson, Sept. 16, 1844; *Amer. Hist. Assn. Rep.* 1899, 614.

with the command of the army that was intended to be sent to Texas, and Santa Anna therefore turned over the presidency to General Herrera as president of the council. Herrera, however, only held it for about three weeks, for Canalizo came back to Mexico on September 19, and two days later took up the work of the office.

The government soon afterward determined to ask Congress to authorize a loan of ten million dollars to carry on the war with Texas, and to meet other necessary public expenses, this request being based on the assertion that the extraordinary tax would fall very far short of producing the four million dollars which had been considered necessary to begin the campaign, so that some other means of raising money was essential. In fact, very little money had yet been collected, nor had anything whatever been done to prepare for an advance, and no hostile measures of any consequence had been taken, in spite of Woll's threats and proclamations. Congress, however, was proving itself more and more independent of Santa Anna, and the most serious opposition to the loan at once developed.

Llaca, a member of the Chamber of Deputies from Querétaro, gave the project its death-blow in the latter part of October. The man, he said, who had caused the loss of Texas on that unhappy day when he gave to the rebel colonists the victory of San Jacinto by going to sleep in front of the enemy had no right, under a pretence of carrying on a Texan war, to exact impossible sacrifices from the nation; and the galleries saluted the speech with enthusiastic and noisy applause. Long newspaper controversies followed as to whether Santa Anna or Filisola had lost Texas, and the historical discussion diverted attention from the proposed ten-million-dollar loan.

In order to arouse congressional enthusiasm to the point of voting money, the government, in accordance with their usual course, now published in the official organ their correspondence with Shannon, the United States minister, who had been received on the first of September, 1844. In accordance with his instructions he had duly presented to