

furnish the means of accomplishing it. With such causes at work war between the United States and Texas would be inevitable.

"England will be a party to it, from necessity, if not from choice; and the other great powers of the world will not be idle spectators of a contest involving such momentous results. I think it almost certain that the peace of the civilized world, the stability of long established institutions, and the destinies of millions, both in Europe and America, hang on the decision which Texas shall now pronounce."¹

Such, then, was the attitude of the governments of the United States and Texas in the middle of January, 1844. Tyler and his Secretary of State were eager and hopeful for the success of the project, and were professing—probably quite sincerely—the belief that a failure to carry it forward might result in the most serious calamities. On the other side were Houston and his Secretary of State, urged on by a nearly unanimous population, but held back for the time being by the fear that the making of a treaty might be the signal for an actual invasion at last by the Mexican forces.

¹ Upshur to Murphy, Jan. 16, 1844; H. R. Doc. 271, 28 Cong., 1 sess., 43-48. Italics in original.

CHAPTER XXIII

TYLER'S TREATY OF ANNEXATION

GENERAL ALMONTE, the Mexican minister in Washington, arriving at his post late in the year 1842, lent an attentive ear to all the gossip that floated about the capital in reference to Texan affairs. All that he learned led him to urge again and again upon his government the importance of speedy military action to reconquer Texas. The newspapers, he wrote, were full of reports that France, England, and the United States had instructed their ministers to offer mediation. He did not think that much attention should be paid to these proposals, for this was the last resort of the demoralized Texans. It was essential, in his judgment, not to let this opportunity of recovering Texas escape, for if it was not improved it never would recur again.¹ A little later he wrote that public opinion in the United States with respect to Texas had never been more favorable for Mexico. He hoped to obtain from the President a proclamation of neutrality, which would serve to discourage emigration to Texas, and would give Mexico the right to treat "with rigor" those who might be found, in spite of warnings, within the revolted territory.² Six weeks afterward he was less hopeful. Public opinion, he reported, was still favorable to Mexico, but he could not be certain how long it would so continue if unfortunately the campaign against Texas was not begun in March or April. Up to the time of writing no proposition for the admission of Texas to the Union had been made, but he did not doubt that at the next session of Congress, in December, 1843, this would be one of the principal matters under discussion. By that

¹ Almonte to Minister of Relations, Nov. 15, 1842; *Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico, MSS.*

² Same to same, Dec. 12, 1842; *ibid.*

time he hoped that Texas would be garrisoned by Mexican troops. The Oregon question with England was full of difficulties, and might result in a war between England and the United States.

"Let us hasten," he said, "to make ready for that event, since we cannot remain indifferent, and we have been too much injured not to take advantage of the occasion which presents itself to us, to obtain vengeance."¹

Writing again only a few days later, he reported that the triumph of the national arms in the town of Mier had so discouraged the adventurers of Texas that all was confusion among them. They mistrusted each other, and even suspected Houston of intrigues with Mexico. No better occasion, therefore, could be presented for recovering the territory, and it was necessary to lose no time, for the Southern members of Congress had intentions with respect to Texas; at the next session they would have a majority, and it would not be surprising if their project should be carried forward. It was therefore, he continued, essential—

"to make good use of the time which will elapse between the close of the present session, which will be the fourth of next March, and the first Monday of December next when the new Congress will meet. It is important that by that time, if the reconquest of Mexico is not complete, at least operations shall be well advanced. If it is not so, I repeat that I fear there may be a reaction in favor of those adventurers and then it will be extremely difficult for us, not to say impossible, to get public opinion again in our favor as it is at present."²

On the fourth of March Almonte saw his worst fears confirmed by the publication of a document signed by John Quincy Adams, Giddings, and eleven other members of Congress, a copy of which he enclosed, and again he urged that before the next session of Congress some part of Texas should be occupied, since this would serve to defeat the plans of the friends of Texas by showing that the United States could not occupy, except at the cost of a war with

¹ Same to same, Jan. 25, 1843; *ibid.*

² Almonte to Minister of Relations, Feb. 7, 1843; *Sec. de Rel. Ext. MSS.*

Mexico, points which were already occupied *de facto* and *de jure* by the Mexican government.¹

The paper which Almonte enclosed was dated March 3, 1843, and was widely circulated in the American press. Its signers, in the most positive language, asserted that a large part of the Southern states had solemnly and unalterably determined that the plan of annexing Texas should be speedily carried into execution, so that "the undue ascendancy of the slave-holding power of the government shall be secured and riveted beyond all redemption." The effort to accomplish this purpose had already, it was said, led to settlements in Texas by citizens of the United States, to the creation of difficulties with the Mexican government, to the bringing about of a revolt, and to the declaration of an independent government; and all the attempts of Mexico to reduce "her revolted province" to obedience had proved unsuccessful because of the unlawful aid of individuals in the United States and the co-operation of the American government. The open and repeated enlistment of troops within the United States and the occupation of Nacogdoches by Gaines's troops "at a moment critical for the fate of the insurgents," the entire neglect of the United States government to prevent "bodies of our own citizens enlisted, organized and officered within our own borders and marched in arms and battle array upon the territory and against the inhabitants of a friendly government, in aid of free-booters and insurgents," and the "premature" recognition of the independence of Texas, were all brought forward as proofs that annexation and the formation of several new slave-holding states had always been the policy and design of the South and of the national executive.

Thus far the address was simply a reproduction of the assertions which had been originally made by Benjamin Lundy eight years before, and which had formed the constant themes of Mexican official communications. But what made the address remarkable was the suggestion that annexation would be a violation of the national compact

¹ Same to same, March 4, 1843; *ibid.*

and "identical with dissolution"; that it would be an attempt to "eternize" slavery; and that this would be so unjust and so injurious to the interests and feelings of the people of the free states as to justify fully a dissolution of the Union.¹

The spectacle of an ex-President of the United States advocating a dissolution of the Union was not likely to commend itself to sober-minded citizens, and the address was not much heeded within the limits of the United States, but in Mexico it met with a more congenial reception. It was naturally not very easy for Mexican officials to know what weight to attach to an address of this description, and it seems to have been considered wise, after some weeks of consideration, to announce the opposition of Mexico to any project of annexation and the determination of the Mexican government to take vigorous measures. The first step was to issue a proclamation, on June 17, 1843, directing that in future no quarter should be granted to any foreigner who invaded the territory of the republic, "whether he be accompanied in his enterprise by a few or by many adventurers . . . and all such persons taken with arms in their hands shall be immediately put to death."² This was followed by a note from the Minister of Foreign Relations to the American minister in Mexico, declaring that the Mexican government would consider the passage of an act for the incorporation of Texas with the United States as equivalent to a declaration of war against the Mexican republic.

What with Adams and his friends on one side and Mexico on the other, the United States was thus threatened with both civil and foreign war. Calmly considered, neither of these threats was very formidable; for neither was backed by any respectable force.

So far as Mexico was concerned Thompson made short work of her protest. He instantly replied that the direct threat of war made by the Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations precluded any explanation whatever upon the

¹ Niles's *Reg.*, LXIV, 173.

² Sen. Doc. 1, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 34.

subject. The American government, he said, had no desire for a war with Mexico; but if anything could excite such a feeling it would be a constant repetition of threats, which he requested might not be repeated. If intended for intimidation they would have no effect, and if as a warning they were not necessary.

This reply was approved by the State Department, but Thompson was instructed that if he should be again addressed in terms so offensive, he must demand that the letter be withdrawn or that a suitable apology for it be made. "You will at the same time inform the Mexican government that you can hold no intercourse with it, except on such terms of courtesy and respect as are due to the honor and dignity of the United States."¹

Almonte, the Mexican minister in Washington, took up the subject in the following November in an even more warlike spirit. The Mexican government, he wrote to the State Department, had well-grounded reasons to believe that the Congress of the United States, at its next session, would discuss the annexation of a part of the Mexican territory to that of the United States. Any such measure, if carried into effect, would be considered by Mexico as a direct aggression. If the United States should, in defiance of good faith and of the principles of justice, commit the unprecedented outrage (*inaudito atentado*) of appropriating to itself an integral part of the Mexican territory, the act of the President in approving the annexation of Texas, would, said Almonte, terminate his own mission, as the Mexican government was resolved to declare war the moment it was informed of such an event.

Upshur replied that as General Almonte had made no inquiry from the State Department concerning the facts upon which his letter was founded it was unnecessary either to admit or deny the design imputed to the Congress of the United States.

¹ Bocanegra to Thompson, Aug. 23, 1843; Thompson to Bocanegra, Aug. 24, 1843; Bocanegra to Thompson, Sept. —, 1843; Upshur to Thompson, Oct. 20, 1843; Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., 1 sess., 89-94.

"As to the threat of war made in advance, in the name and by the express order of the Mexican Government, the undersigned reminds General Almonte that it is neither the first nor the second time that Mexico has given the same warning to the United States, under similar circumstances. The undersigned had hoped that the manner in which these threats have heretofore been received and treated had clearly shown to the Mexican Government the light in which they are regarded by that of the United States. The undersigned has now only to add, that as his Government has not, in time past, done any thing inconsistent with the *just* claims of Mexico, the President sees no reason to suppose that Congress will suffer its policy to be affected by the threats of that Government. The President has full reliance on the wisdom and justice of Congress, and cannot anticipate that any occasion will arise to forbid his hearty co-operation in whatever policy that body may choose to pursue, either towards Mexico or any other Power.

"In conclusion, the undersigned reminds General Almonte that this Government is under no necessity to learn, from that of Mexico, what is due to its own honor or to the rights of other nations. It is therefore quite unnecessary that General Almonte, in his future communications to this department, should admonish this Government either to respect its duties or to take care of its reputation, in any contingency which the Mexican Government may choose to anticipate."

Almonte replied, softening some of the expressions contained in his note, but intimating that Upshur's language implied ignorance of any project being in hand for the annexation of Texas or that the submission of such a question to Congress was under consideration, and he would "highly value" a formal declaration to that effect. To this Upshur answered that it was evidently impossible for him to disavow any purpose to annex Texas to the Union so far as the action of Congress might be concerned, and that, considering the attitude which Mexico had chosen to assume, such a disavowal on the part of the President could not be reasonably expected, whatever his views and intentions might be. He would, however, make what he called an "explicit explanation":

"Near eight years," he wrote, "have elapsed since Texas declared her independence. During all that time Mexico has asserted her

right of jurisdiction and dominion over that country, and has endeavored to enforce it by arms. Texas has successfully resisted all such attempts, and has thus afforded ample proof of her ability to maintain her independence. This proof has been so satisfactory to many of the most considerable nations of the world, that they have formally acknowledged the independence of Texas, and established diplomatic relations with her. Among these nations the United States are included; and indeed they set the example which other nations have followed. Under these circumstances, the United States regard Texas as in all respects an independent nation, fully competent to manage its own affairs, and possessing all the rights of other independent nations. The Government of the United States, therefore, will not consider it necessary to consult any other nation in its transactions with the Government of Texas."¹

Four days after Upshur's final letter to Almonte the President sent the correspondence with his annual message to Congress. He regarded it, he said, as not a little extraordinary that the government of Mexico, in advance of a public discussion on the subject of Texas, should so far have anticipated the result of such discussion as to have announced its determination to meet the decision of Congress by a formal declaration of war against the United States. If designed to prevent Congress from considering the question, the President had no reason to doubt that it would entirely fail of its object. Certainly the executive department of the government would not fail, for any such cause, to discharge its whole duty to the country.

No allusion was made in the message to any prospect of negotiations with Texas, but a large part of it was taken up by complaints against the action of the Mexican government in respect to various matters, such as a renewal of the prohibition against foreigners carrying on retail trade in Mexico. Particular stress was laid on the mode in which Mexico had conducted its war with Texas. This war, the President said, consisted for the most part of predatory incursions, which had been attended with much suffering to individuals, but had failed to approach to any definite result. Mexico

¹ Almonte to Upshur, Nov. 3, 1843; Upshur to Almonte, Nov. 8, 1843; Almonte to Upshur, Nov. 11, 1843; Upshur to Almonte, Dec. 1, 1843; Sen. Doc. 341, 23 Cong., 1 sess., 94-103.

had fitted out no formidable armament by sea or land for the subjugation of Texas. The interests of the United States were involved in seeing an end put to this state of hostilities, and the government could not be indifferent to the fact that such a warfare was calculated to weaken both powers, and finally to render them the subjects of interference on the part of stronger nations, who might attempt to bring about "a compliance with terms, as the condition of their interposition, alike derogatory to the nation granting them, and detrimental to the interests of the United States." After this fling at England, the President declared that he thought it becoming to the United States to hold a language to Mexico of an unambiguous character. It was time that this war ceased. There must be a limit to all wars; and if the parent state, after an eight years' struggle, had failed to reduce its revolted subjects to submission, she ought not to expect that other nations would look on quietly, to their own obvious injury.

The President's hints at British interference in the affairs of Texas excited Aberdeen's very pronounced indignation, and he instructed Pakenham to remonstrate with the American Secretary of State, and to point out that the President's language when speaking of the measures which the United States might have occasion to adopt accorded ill with his condemnation of the supposed designs of other powers.¹ At the same time instructions were sent to Lord Cowley, in Paris, stating that the President evidently contemplated the annexation of Texas, a measure which neither France nor England could look upon with indifference. The views of the French court were therefore to be ascertained, and a proposal made that they should join in a remonstrance to the American government.²

¹ Aberdeen to Pakenham, Jan. 9, 1844; E. D. Adams, 156. Copies of these instructions, and those of Dec. 26, 1843, to Pakenham (referred to below) were sent to the British legation in Mexico, and were read to Bocanegra by Bankhead at a long interview on March 29, 1844. Bocanegra asked what the object of the British government was in communicating all this, and Bankhead could only say that it was intended to show the frankness and friendliness with which the British government was acting.—(Memo. filed in *Sec. de Rel. Ext. MSS.*)

² Aberdeen to Cowley, Jan. 12, 1844; E. D. Adams, 158.

Cowley at once executed his orders, and reported that he found both the King and Guizot in perfect sympathy with Aberdeen's ideas. The King in particular expressed himself as thinking that the independence of Texas should be maintained, and a barrier thus opposed to the encroachment of the United States, "whose object was not only to take possession of Texas, but at some future period to make that province a stepping-stone to Mexico."¹ But notwithstanding the harmony of the British and French governments in agreeing to instruct their agents in Washington to protest against annexation, no such instructions were sent at that time.²

Meanwhile, the Texan administration was reluctantly being pressed toward annexation. Houston and Anson Jones were undoubtedly, at that moment, opposed to the step; but they could not stand out indefinitely against the pressure of local public opinion and the evidences they were daily receiving of the eagerness of the American government. They had also some evidence of the temper of the American Senate, and they were constantly hearing the views of members of the Texan Congress; but before Houston would commit himself definitely to a negotiation he thought it prudent to submit the whole question of annexation to the latter body.

On January 20, 1844, he therefore sent a secret message to Congress, in which he asserted that he had carefully abstained during his present administration from expressing any opinion in reference to the subject, and he thought it unbecoming in him now to express any. He went on, however, to point out that if any effort were to be made on the part of Texas to effect the object of annexation, "which is so desirable," and such an effort should fail of acceptance by the United States, it might have a seriously prejudicial

¹ Cowley to Aberdeen, Jan. 15, 1844; *ibid.*, 159. The traditional policy of France had always been opposed to the growth of the United States. See the point discussed in McLaughlin's *The Confederation and the Constitution*, 89.

² Smith reported, after a conversation with Guizot in February, that the French and British governments had united in a protest to the United States against the annexation of Texas.—(Smith to Jones, Feb. 29, 1844; *Tex. Dip. Corr.*, II, 1481.) But no instructions to this effect have been found in the archives, and certainly no such protest was ever received.

influence upon the course which England and France might otherwise be disposed to take, and might to a great extent diminish the claims of Texas to the confidence of other nations and create distrust on their part. For these reasons "the utmost caution and secrecy on our part, as to the true motives of our policy, should be carefully observed." If annexation could not be obtained, at any rate, "a treaty of alliance, defensive at least," might be entered into with the United States. Immediate action was desirable, as the American Congress would be likely soon to indicate their disposition and course of policy toward Texas. Action, however, must be taken first by the United States, "and we must now watch and meet their disposition towards us. If we evince too much anxiety, it will be regarded as impertinence, and the voice of supplication seldom commands great respect." He therefore proposed the appointment of "an additional agent to the Government of the United States to co-operate with our agent there."¹

Without waiting for the action of the Texan Congress upon this proposal, instructions were sent to Van Zandt, in Washington, directing him to begin negotiations for a treaty of annexation, provided he was "satisfied that the door will be opened by the Congress of the United States . . . in any manner which may seem to ensure certain success." The main outlines of a treaty were suggested, but Van Zandt was told that there were many points of minor importance, as to which instructions would be furnished "so soon as this government is advised of the fact that the measure of annexation is made *certain* to Texas by the action of the present Congress or Senate of the United States." In that event, if the Texan Congress voted an appropriation, a special minister to act in conjunction with Van Zandt would be sent.²

¹ Van Zandt in his despatch of Sept. 18, 1843, above referred to, had suggested that, in view of the great importance of the business, some other person might be empowered to represent Texas.—(*Ibid.*, 210.) See J. H. Smith's *Annexation of Texas*, 160-162, as to the pressure brought to bear by the Texan Congress upon Houston.

² Jones to Van Zandt, Jan. 27, 1844; *Tex. Dip. Corr.*, II, 248. Italics in original.

The Texan Congress did not act upon Houston's message until just before its adjournment on February 5, 1844, when an appropriation of five thousand dollars was made to cover the expense of an additional representative at Washington; and on the tenth of February, Houston sent for General J. Pinckney Henderson to offer him the position thus created. Henderson, as appeared from his letter of the previous December, was strongly in favor of annexation, but very much opposed to signing a treaty unless its ratification was certain; and in this he was fully in accord with the views then publicly professed by the Texan administration.

Their views had, however, been in some measure modified by the receipt of Van Zandt's despatch of the twentieth of January, in which he reported the willingness of the American government to protect Texas against Mexico after a treaty was signed. It seems to have been thought by Houston and his advisers that if these assurances were put in a more definite shape, it would be safe to proceed, even without any certainty as to what the American Senate might do.

The first step was, therefore, to get a written undertaking from Murphy, who called upon President Houston, on the same tenth of February, to present to him Upshur's views as contained in the instructions of January 16, urging the pressing importance of annexation. Murphy was surprised and, of course, greatly pleased to learn that the Texan government had at last determined to negotiate, and he accepted without a protest the statement that before actually entering upon the business, a promise would be required from him that the United States would protect, or aid in the protection of Texas, pending the proposed negotiation. This promise Murphy readily gave.

"I trust," he said, "my Government will at once see the propriety of this course of policy; for I found it impossible to induce this Government to enter heartily into the measure of annexation without an assurance that my Government would not fail to guard Texas against all the evils which were likely to assail Texas in consequence of her meeting and complying with the wishes of the United States. . . . I

took upon myself a great responsibility, but the cause required it, and you will, I hope, justify me to the President."¹

With this official despatch Murphy sent a hastily scribbled note, marked "Confidential."

"The President of Texas," it ran, "begs me to request you that no time be lost in sending a sufficient fleet into the Gulf, subject to my order, to act in Defence of the Texan Coast, in case of a naval descent by Mexico and that an active force of mounted men, or cavalry be held ready on the line of U. S. contiguous to Texas to act in her defence by land—for says the President 'I know the Treaty will be made & we must suffer for it. If the U. States is not ready to defend us'—do comply with his wishes immediately.

"Yours truly in great Haste, as the Express is ready mounted & waiting at the Door

"W. S. MURPHY."²

Nothing could better paint Houston's frame of mind than this hurried scrawl, with its almost pathetic entreaty for ships and troops "contiguous" to the border, and the expression of a conviction that Texas "must suffer for it," if the treaty were made. However, Houston had now done what he could to guard against the evil he anticipated; and Henderson, having accepted the task assigned to him, was duly furnished with his commission and full powers. No detailed written instructions were given him at the time, as he was told that the President placed great reliance upon his skill, judgment, and intimate knowledge of the subject. Only one condition was imposed. Before entering upon the negotiation, measures must be taken to obtain from the American government as full a guarantee as that given by Murphy.³

On February 25, 1844, further instructions were sent, to the effect that the Texan representatives were to be guided by views previously expressed; but they were further directed to see that provision was made for ultimately erecting four states out of the Texan territory, that the Texan

¹ Murphy to Upshur, Feb. 15, 1844; H. R. Doc. 271, 28 Cong., 1 sess., 92.

² *State Dept. MSS.*

³ Jones to Henderson, Feb. 15, 1844; *Tex. Dip. Corr.*, II, 252.

navy was to be paid for by the United States, and that the boundary was to extend to the Rio Grande.¹

At the very time these preliminary discussions looking to annexation were going on, the commissioners who had been sent to Mexico to conclude an armistice were still proceeding with their negotiations without a hint from their own government that any change was intended in its policy. As late as the third of February Houston was writing them, expressing a hopeful feeling as to the result of their labors, and alluding quite casually to the rumor that there was much excitement in the United States in relation to annexation.² The Texan commissioners persevered, and on the eighteenth of February signed an agreement with the Mexican representatives which was sent to Houston for his approval.

Houston's conduct in the matter was, to say the least of it, wanting in candor. He rejected the agreement without notice to Mexico, and without any statement of his reasons. Later on it was explained that the ground for his action was the fact that the agreement referred to Texas as a "Department" of Mexico; but the real reason was, of course, the fact that he had embarked upon hopeful negotiations with the United States, and that he wished to gain time by keeping Mexico in ignorance of his purpose.³

By the end of March, 1844, the Texan administration had thus secretly but definitely abandoned the policy of attempting to make peace with Mexico, and had thrown themselves unreservedly into the arms of the United States. Their decision was officially made known in a despatch to the Texan representatives in Washington, who were now instructed that if they were unable to conclude a treaty of annexation "within the limits of the instructions" already given them, they were vested "with discretionary powers to conclude said Treaty upon the best terms possible to be

¹ Jones to Henderson and Van Zandt, Feb. 25, 1844; *ibid.*, 259.

² Houston to Hockley and Williams, Feb. 3, 1844; *ibid.*, 786-789.

³ Yoakum, II, 421. See also Houston to Van Zandt and Henderson, May 10, 1844, and Jones to same, March 26 and May 2, 1844; *Tex. Dip. Corr.*, II, 278, 265, 276.

attained."¹ Houston and his cabinet were ready to take anything they could get.

The steps preparatory to a treaty of annexation had not been so secretly taken but that some account of the action of Congress reached the newspapers, and the British chargé d'affaires wrote asking for explanations on the subject of Henderson's mission. Such explanations, he thought, were due to the governments of Great Britain and France,

"for it is not to be supposed that they could continue to press the government of Mexico to settle upon one basis while there was any reason to surmise that negotiations were either in actual existence or in contemplation, proposing a combination of a totally different nature."²

Elliot also wrote privately to Jones, the Secretary of State, expressing a hope that the answer of the Texan government would be satisfactory and his conviction "that the President has not the least intention, so far as he or his Cabinet is concerned, of sacrificing the independence of the country and the well-founded hope of an honorable and early adjustment, to the exigencies of party spirit, and intrigue and electioneering trick in any quarter whatever."³

In reply, Elliot was informed that, although Texas had the greatest confidence in the good-will of the British government, she felt that there was no prospect of any result from mediation. The negotiations for an armistice had failed. The Texan prisoners had not been released. The British minister at Mexico had quarrelled with the Mexican government, and had ceased to hold any intercourse with them.⁴ There was no assurance from either England or France that Santa Anna would not immediately invade the Texan frontiers. Under these circumstances, as the proposition for annexation had been made by the United States government, and as pledges had been given by it for protection

¹ Jones to Van Zandt, March 26, 1844; *ibid.*, II, 266.

² Elliot to Jones, March 22, 1844; Niles's *Reg.*, LXVIII, 35.

³ Elliot to Jones, March 22, 1844; Jones, 330.

⁴ The quarrel arose over a display, at a ball given by Santa Anna, of a British flag, among trophies captured from the Texans in New Mexico.

against her enemy, the republic had accepted the American proposals for the sake of peace and future security.¹

With these explanations Elliot had perforce to be content. He had written to the British Foreign Office as late as February 17 that any immediate danger of annexation was at an end, and he seems at that time to have felt confident that independence for Texas was assured; but he was now reduced to consoling himself with the prospect that the American Senate would reject any treaty of annexation.²

Meanwhile Van Zandt was busy discussing with Upshur the terms of a treaty, and before Henderson had even left Texas all the main points had been agreed upon. Written drafts had been exchanged, and Van Zandt thought that if final instructions had then arrived "the treaty could have been concluded in half a day."³

During the period of these negotiations Almonte, on the other hand, had been hopeful and even confident that nothing would come of the agitation for annexation. In December, 1843, he had a long conversation with John Quincy Adams, who, he reported, assured him that the views of the South would not be realized, even though there was a majority in the House of Representatives in favor of the measure, because the Senate would be against it. Almonte felt confident, from this and other information, that, though there would be much talk, nothing would be done by Congress. Tyler, he said, had no popularity, and sensible people in the United States were all in favor of Mexico.⁴ Some weeks later Almonte felt less confident. He still thought that Congress would do nothing about the annexation of

¹ Yoakum, II, 427. See also calendar of printed correspondence; *Tex. Dip. Corr.*, II, 46.

² E. D. Adams, 155. Elliot was absent from Texas the greater part of the year 1844. He wrote from New Orleans on February 10, 1844, that he had had a good opportunity of judging the real state of feeling in the United States respecting annexation, and was persuaded it was entirely out of the question. —(Jones, 308.) His principal informant was Henry Clay. In his private letter to Jones of March 22, quoted above, he said that he was sure there was not the most remote chance of carrying the scheme of annexation through the United States Senate.—(*Ibid.*, 329.)

³ Van Zandt to Jones, March 5, 1844; *Tex. Dip. Corr.*, II, 261.

⁴ Almonte to Minister of Relations, Dec. 11, 1843; *Sec. de Rel. Ext. MSS.*