

or all three together, might persuade Mexico to accept their mediation. To one of these solutions—intervention by the United States or mediation by one or more foreign powers—the diplomatic efforts of Texas were necessarily addressed.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Further details as to some of the subjects treated of in this chapter will be found in Mr. T. M. Marshall's article on "Diplomatic Relations of Texas and the United States, 1839-1843," *Tex. Hist. Quar.*, XV, 267-293.

## CHAPTER XX

### THE WHIGS AND MEXICO

In the preceding chapters the political history of Mexico and Texas has been traced down to the end of the year 1844; and it next becomes necessary to relate the course of events in the United States—so far, at least, as those events had any bearing upon the destinies of the two neighboring republics.

It will be remembered that President Van Buren's administration had very positively declined, in the summer of 1837, to give any consideration to the proposal for the annexation of Texas, and that Texas herself, in the course of the following year, had formally withdrawn the proposal. On December 9, 1838, Lamar had been inaugurated President of the infant republic, and had expressed himself, in his very finest language, as definitely opposed to reopening negotiations.<sup>1</sup> From the moment it became generally known that neither the United States nor Texas desired annexation the exciting subject lost its interest. Petitions ceased to be presented to the American Congress, debates turned on other matters, and the question of Texas played no part at all in the extremely active presidential campaign of 1840.

Van Buren was renominated by the Democratic convention, which met at Baltimore, May 5, 1840. The platform declared that Congress had no authority to interfere with slavery in the states; that all efforts of the abolitionists to induce Congress to act in this matter were alarming and

<sup>1</sup> "A long train of consequences of the most appalling character and magnitude have never failed to present themselves whenever I have entertained the subject, and forced upon my mind the unwelcome conviction that the step once taken, must produce a lasting regret, and ultimately prove as disastrous to our liberty and hopes as the triumphant sword of the enemy."



dangerous to the Union; and that public moneys should not be deposited in banking institutions. In addition, the platform disapproved "internal improvements," federal assumption of state debts, the fostering of one industry so as to injure another, the raising of more money than was required for the necessary expenses of the government, and the creation of a national bank. The word "Texas" was not mentioned.

The Whig convention had previously met at Harrisburg, in December, 1839, but it had put forward no platform. The reason for this failure to issue any declaration of principles was well understood. The delegates could not possibly have agreed on any statement whatever. "A platform," said the candidate for Vice-President, "would have scattered us to the winds";<sup>1</sup> and indeed the Whig party, which had only come into existence during Jackson's second administration, was not a political party at all, in any proper sense of the word. It was composed of a number of factions, who only agreed in their opposition to Jackson and Van Buren, and who were opposed to each other upon every other subject. It comprised as its most numerous and conspicuous group the "National Republicans," chiefly Clay's worshippers, who had been outspoken in favor of "internal improvements" and protective duties. It comprised extreme "state-rights" advocates, who were opposed to both "internal improvements" and high tariffs, but who had been angered by Jackson's proclamation of 1832 against nullification. It comprised a majority of the anti-Masons, who detested Clay. It comprised many men who had supported Jackson, but who had been driven away by what they regarded as his high-handed and arbitrary action. And it comprised a small group who, under the name of Conservatives, finally abandoned the fortunes of Van Buren because they could not support his independent treasury scheme, believing that the moneys of the United States should be deposited under proper safeguards with the state banks.

<sup>1</sup> Tyler, *Letters and Times of the Tylers*, I, 596.

The accepted leaders of the most numerous branch of the Whig party were Webster and Clay, although outside of New England Webster had little support, and six months before the Harrisburg convention met had taken himself out of the contest. Clay, on the other hand, had friends and supporters everywhere; but he had also active and influential enemies in the party, the result of whose activities was the nomination of William Henry Harrison, of Ohio.

Harrison was a native of Virginia, the son of Benjamin Harrison, one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence. He had entered the army when a mere lad; had served in the West under Anthony Wayne; had been secretary of the Northwest Territory and governor of what was called the Indiana Territory; and had been active and successful in the War of 1812. At the battle of Tippecanoe he had broken up the strongest Indian federation, and at the battle of the Thames he had defeated the British and recovered possession of Detroit. He was no genius in military any more than in civil affairs, but in a war where there had been very little glory for anybody the smallest success was a mark of distinction for a fortunate commander.

Since the close of the war Harrison had represented Ohio in both houses of Congress, where he had played an extremely modest part, and had been appointed by Adams, near the close of his administration, as minister to Colombia. One of Jackson's first acts had been to recall Harrison, and since 1829 he had been living in a very small way on a farm near Cincinnati. Both as a follower of Clay's wing of the Whig coalition, and as a military "hero" Harrison was distinctly available. He had no inconvenient record; he was connected with some of the leading families in the South; he was not obnoxious to slave-holding constituencies; and he was popularly believed to be living the simple life of the poorest farmer.

The Whig candidate for Vice-President, who was destined to have a far larger influence over public affairs than usually falls to the lot of Vice-Presidents, was John Tyler, of Virginia. He was the son of a former governor of Virginia



who had been the neighbor and friend of Benjamin Harrison. John Tyler had entered public life almost at the moment he was twenty-one. He was now a little short of fifty, and had been in public life almost without a break ever since his majority. He had served in the legislature of his native state, had been governor of Virginia, and had had, from time to time, a seat in one house or the other of Congress. He was a kindly and well-educated man, of agreeable manners, and of strong though narrow beliefs; and the political opinion to which he chiefly clung, and which had notoriously served to guide him throughout his career in Congress, had been an unqualified and unwavering belief in the doctrine of state rights.

In Congress he had been almost always in opposition. He had voted against internal improvements. His vote was the only one cast in the Senate against the "force bill" of 1833.<sup>1</sup> He believed the Missouri compromise to be unconstitutional. He deplored the existence of slavery, but declared that he would tolerate no officious interference from without. He was a free-trader, and had voted against the tariff of 1828 and the tariff of 1832, although he had supported if not inspired Clay's proposal which resulted in the compromise tariff of 1833. One of Tyler's strongest convictions was the unconstitutionality of the United States Bank. The fact that the law creating it had been upheld by a decision of the Supreme Court did not at all shake his convictions as to his own duty. When the question of renewing the bank's charter came up he voted against it, though he also voted against the withdrawal of the deposits, regarding it as a harsh and arbitrary measure. His career had been straightforward and consistent, and was perfectly well known to all who cared to inquire. He certainly had nothing whatever in common with such leaders as Clay and Webster, having in fact been opposed to almost every measure with which they were identified; and his nomination on the same ticket with Harrison was such an open bid for

<sup>1</sup> The other Southern members opposed to this bill left the Senate when it was brought up and declined to vote.

Southern support as fairly personified the real spirit of the Whig party and the Harrisburg convention.

Clay, who was greatly disappointed at the failure of the convention to nominate him, is said to have protested that he was the most unfortunate man in the history of parties—"always run by my friends when sure to be defeated, and now betrayed for a nomination when I, or any one, would be sure of an election." There was indeed little doubt as to the result of the election. The bad times which had prevailed since 1837 had made the administration unpopular; there had been scandalous speculation on the part of some of the Democratic office-holders, and the tyranny of the Democratic organization had driven out of the party many of its most influential supporters. The campaign, however, was very vigorously fought after a fashion of its own.

"There has probably never been a presidential campaign," says Schurz, "of more enthusiasm and less thought than the Whig campaign of 1840. As soon as it was fairly started, it resolved itself into a popular frolic. There was no end of monster mass meetings, with log cabins, raccoons, and hard cider. One half of the American people seemed to have stopped work to march in processions behind brass bands or drum and fife, to attend huge picnics, and to sing campaign doggerel about 'Tippecanoe and Tyler too.' . . . The immense multitudes who gathered at the meetings came to be amused, not to be instructed. They met, not to think and deliberate, but to laugh and shout and sing."<sup>1</sup>

As a result of this novel method of campaigning the total popular vote cast was immensely in excess of anything known in former elections, and the Whig candidates received an immense popular majority. In the electoral college the vote was nearly four to one in their favor.

Harrison, when he was inaugurated, was not in good health. He was nearly sixty-eight years old, and was subjected, from the time he reached Washington, to an excessive strain upon all his faculties. Just a month after his inauguration he died, but he had lived long enough to make up

<sup>1</sup> Schurz, *Clay*, II, 186.



his cabinet, and to summon a special session of Congress, which was to meet on May 31, 1841.

Clay had at first been offered the position of Secretary of State, but he declined it in order to remain the leader of Congress. Thereupon Harrison appointed Webster Secretary of State. Francis Granger, of New York, who was regarded as one of Webster's friends, and was an anti-Mason and an anti-slavery man, was appointed Postmaster-General; but the Secretaries of the Treasury, of War, and of the Navy, as well as the Attorney-General, were intimate friends and supporters of Clay. In this cabinet Tyler, upon his accession, made no change, although there was not a man in it who was his friend or who shared his peculiar constitutional views.

The firmness with which the new President held these views was soon put to the test. The object of the special session of Congress had been loudly proclaimed by Clay and the exulting and victorious Whigs to be the entire overthrow of the financial legislation of Van Buren's administration. They meant to repeal the law establishing the independent treasury, to re-establish a central bank, to amend the tariff, and to provide for the distribution of the proceeds of land sales among the states. There was no difficulty in passing an act abolishing the independent treasury; but the next step, that of framing a charter for a new United States bank which should meet the approval of the President, was a much more serious undertaking. Tyler's objections to a central bank were based upon his strong belief that Congress had no power to confer on any banking corporation chartered by it authority to act in the various states; but he announced his willingness to sign a bill which should provide for creating a bank in the District of Columbia, with authority to establish branches in the several states, but only with the assent of such states. Such a form of charter would, however, have been of very little practical value, and the bill as passed by Congress provided that the assent of the states should be presumed, unless dissent was expressed within a limited time. This bill Tyler, as might have been foreseen, at once vetoed.

Negotiations followed in an effort to frame a measure that would accomplish what the friends of a central bank desired, and at the same time would not be obnoxious to the President's constitutional scruples. The majority of Tyler's cabinet seem to have supposed that they had got his assent to a measure which they submitted to him, but when a bill in that form was hurriedly passed by both houses of Congress it was again vetoed. A very violent controversy broke out, which unfortunately turned, in part, upon questions of the President's veracity. All the members of the cabinet, with the exception of Webster, resigned their places, and Tyler was left without a party, and almost without supporters.

Webster had been in doubt as to his own course, and therefore, when his colleagues threatened to resign, he invited the Massachusetts delegation in Congress to meet him and laid the case before them. The resignations of four members of the cabinet—Clay's four followers—were to be sent, he said, to the President the next morning.

"Mr. Webster then, addressing me," says Adams, "said that, being thus placed in a peculiar position, and seeing no sufficient cause for resigning his office, he had requested this meeting to consult with the members of the delegation and to have the benefit of their opinions, assuring them that as to the office itself it was a matter of the most perfect indifference to him whether he retained or resigned it—a declaration which it is possible he believed when he made it. But he had prefaced it by stating that he saw no cause sufficient to justify his resignation. It was like Falstaff's recruit 'Bullcalf.' 'In very truth, sir, I had as lief be hanged, sir, as go; and yet, for mine own part, sir, I do not care; but rather because I am unwilling, and for mine own part have a desire to stay with my friends; else, sir, I did not care for mine own part so much.' . . . For himself, Mr. Webster said, Mr. Tyler had never treated him with disrespect, and he had no doubt it was his desire that he should remain in the Department of State. . . . But the joint resignation of the four heads of Departments together was a Clay movement, to make up an issue before the people against Mr. Tyler. We all agreed that Mr. Webster would not be justified in resigning at this time; but we all felt that the hour for the requiem of the Whig party was at hand."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Adams, *Memoirs*, XI, 13.



It was indeed natural to conclude that the Whig party was on its death-bed. The break between the President and the main body of the party was complete and irremediable. Clay at the beginning of the special session of Congress had "entered the Senate as a captain of a ship would step on deck to give his orders,"<sup>1</sup> and he had failed in all the objects nearest his heart. The resignation of the members of the cabinet had been devised by him in the hope of making a complete breach between the mass of the Whig party and the President; but Webster's refusal to resign served to prevent the plan from being carried out to its full extent. The President felt confident that, with the aid of Webster, he could now go forward to create a new party which would overthrow Clay and all his friends. "I will say to you," said the President to Webster, when the latter announced that he would stay in the cabinet, "that Henry Clay is a doomed man from this hour."<sup>2</sup>

The resignations of Clay's friends, followed by that of Granger, the Postmaster-General, were sent in to the President on Saturday, the eleventh of September, and Congress was to adjourn at noon on the following Tuesday. The President believed and said that the intention was to prevent him from having any cabinet at all until Congress should meet again in December, for the Constitution only authorized him to fill, without the consent of the Senate, vacancies that might happen during its recess, and these vacancies had been carefully timed so as to happen just before a recess. Tyler, however, had evidently been considering for some time the constitution of a new cabinet, and by Monday morning he was ready with a complete list of names which were submitted to the Senate and immediately confirmed. The men named, he wrote, were, like himself, "all original Jackson men, and mean to act upon Republican principles."<sup>3</sup>

But Tyler's visions of a regenerated Whig party, led by himself and Webster amid the applause of the country, was

<sup>1</sup> Schurz, *Clay*, II, 204.

<sup>2</sup> *Letters and Times of the Tylers*, II, 122.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 125.

destined to a swift and rude awakening. He found himself not only without a party, but without friends in the press, and the object of loudly expressed popular detestation as a traitor to the Whig party, which had honored him with office. Nor were conditions any better when Congress met in the regular session. The Clay Whigs were found to be in a majority, which was unshaken by any defection, except of an insignificant few, whom Clay contemptuously called the corporal's guard. From the first Monday in December, 1841, until the last day of August, 1842, therefore, Congress sat, doggedly determined to carry out none of the President's recommendations. It failed for a long time even to provide the necessary means for carrying on the government.

The Whigs were desirous of passing a measure—to which the President was strongly opposed—for distributing among the states the proceeds of the sales of public lands; and they endeavored to secure their end by tacking this measure to a tariff bill. Tyler had no serious objection to the tariff bill, but he objected to the distribution of money in the Treasury among the states. He therefore vetoed two successive tariff bills, and undertook to lecture Congress upon their duty.

The second veto roused the Whigs to an extraordinary pitch of indignation. The President's message, whatever may have been its faults of taste and temper, was at least an act entirely within his constitutional province. But the House of Representatives, to which it was addressed, publicly denounced his conduct as an "abusive" exercise of power, and adopted the report of a special committee, of which John Quincy Adams was chairman, which expressed the opinion that it was a case for impeachment. The committee further advised the adoption of a joint resolution—which was immediately passed by the House and never heard of again—recommending to the states an amendment to the Constitution by which a majority of each house of Congress, instead of two-thirds, should be sufficient to pass a bill over the President's veto.

The Whigs might well rage, for they were impotent to



pass any measure over the President's veto, supported as he was both by his "corporal's guard" and by the whole strength of the Democratic party in Congress; nor did they dare to press impeachment, for they were beginning to be aware that public opinion outside of Congress, which had manifested itself in the previous autumn in noisy demonstrations against the President, was in rapid process of change. The Whig majority thus had their hands tied by their own President; but in the end Congress passed a tariff bill which omitted the obnoxious provision as to the distribution of the sales of public lands. Congress also made tardy provision for supplying the needs of the government, and adjourned on August 31, 1842, leaving Tyler triumphant and happy. He was still better pleased when the congressional elections in the autumn of 1842 resulted in a crushing defeat for the Whigs, the House of Representatives becoming Democratic by a very large majority. The expiring Congress met again in December, 1842, for the short session, but in a chastened and far more peaceful and conciliatory temper, and it did little beyond the routine appropriation of money.

Webster all this time had continued steadily at his post in the State Department. His refusal to resign with the rest of his colleagues was in reality due to several reasons, of which a desire not to play the part of tail to Clay's kite was undoubtedly one; but it is probable that his chief reason was a patriotic desire to settle the very serious questions then pending with Great Britain, and which bore the appearance of leading to a possible war between the two countries.<sup>1</sup> Adams's chief reason for advising him to stay, in spite of his ungenerous sneers at Webster's attitude, was unquestionably the belief that his "signally conciliatory temper and disposition toward England was indispensably

<sup>1</sup> "I shall not act suddenly; it will look too much like a combination between a Whig Cabinet and a Whig Senate to bother the President. It will not be expected from me to countenance such a proceeding. Then, again, I will not throw the great foreign concerns of the country into disorder or danger, by any abrupt party proceeding."—(Webster to Ketchum, Sept. 10, 1841; *Webster's Private Corr.*, II, 110.)

necessary to save us from a most disastrous and calamitous war."<sup>1</sup>

Into the details of the British negotiations it is unnecessary to enter. In large part they turned upon the irritating controversy concerning the northeastern boundary between the United States and Canada, which had been under discussion for fifty years. If any compromise of the extreme claims on both sides was to be effected—and that seemed the most likely way out—it was apparent that the United States must surrender territory claimed by the state of Maine; and it was also apparent that no one but a New England man possessing the influence and authority that were possessed by Webster could possibly have succeeded in getting such a compromise approved in New England.

The negotiations were conducted with great skill and entire success, and Webster was ably supported by Edward Everett, of Massachusetts (who had been appointed minister to England by Tyler, in July, 1841), and by the good sense and quiet tact of the President, which helped in smoothing over difficulties. The British government, on its side, was represented by Lord Ashburton, a member of that influential family which has given so many statesmen and administrators to the service of the kingdom, and has made the name of Baring known throughout the world. He arrived in the United States early in April, 1842, and on August 9, 1842, a treaty was signed which, with a single exception, practically disposed of every question in controversy between the two countries. The exception was the northwestern boundary of the country, from the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific.

But if most of the dangerous questions on the northern frontier were settled or adjourned, the equally troublesome questions on the southwestern frontier were still open. The first of these problems was that of Texas. To a solution by the simple remedy of annexation President Tyler did seriously incline. As early as October, 1841, very shortly after the reconstruction of his cabinet, he wrote to Webster: "I

<sup>1</sup> Adams, *Memoirs*, XI, 36.



gave you a hint as to the probability of acquiring Texas by treaty. I verily believe it could be done. Could the North be reconciled to it, could anything throw so bright a lustre around us?"<sup>1</sup> But though Webster did not fall in with the suggestion, the subject evidently was a good deal talked about, for in November Adams was much alarmed by statements appearing in newspapers favorable to the administration, to the effect that the project of annexing Texas to the United States was to be revived. In December he read a long article in the *New York Courier and Enquirer* recommending annexation by arguments addressed first of all to the abolitionists.<sup>2</sup>

The fact was that a large majority of the reconstructed cabinet was in favor of annexation. "I feel satisfied fully," wrote the Texan minister in Washington the following spring, "that the administration is decidedly in favor of the policy, and that the Question is a popular one with Congress."<sup>3</sup> The next July the Texan minister had "a full and free conversation" with the President upon the subject of annexation, in the course of which the latter remarked "that he was anxious for it, and wished most sincerely he was able to conclude it at once." The only fear was that a treaty would not be confirmed by the Senate, although there was a majority in favor of annexation, and "the President would act in a moment if the Senate would concur."<sup>4</sup>

In December, 1842, the Texan minister in Washington reported that the President, as well as the majority of his cabinet, were decidedly anxious for annexation, and had so expressed themselves without reserve, the President saying that as soon as he was satisfied that the co-operation of the Senate could be had he would be willing immediately to make the treaty. "Some of the most prominent leading partisans of the President in Congress" were also in favor of his making the treaty, "believing it would render him omnipotent in the South and West," and it was thought

<sup>1</sup> *Letters and Times of the Tylers*, II, 126.

<sup>2</sup> Adams, *Memoirs*, XI, 41.

<sup>3</sup> Reily to Jones, April 14, 1842; *Tex. Dip. Corr.*, I, 552.

<sup>4</sup> Reily to Jones, July 11, 1842; *ibid.*, 567.

that the time would soon arrive when it would be in the power of Texas to secure annexation; and, if Texas still desired it, full powers should be sent so that the negotiation could be begun at the proper time.<sup>1</sup>

But the real obstacle to any effort at annexation was always Webster, who could not be expected, as a Massachusetts Whig, to favor the project. He had expressed a very decided adverse opinion early in Van Buren's administration, first, because there was no need of extending the limits of the Union in that direction, and, second, because of his "entire unwillingness to do anything that shall extend the slavery of the African race on this continent, or add other slave-holding states to the Union";<sup>2</sup> and from that opinion he never departed. While Webster remained in the State Department, and Adams was chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives, the cause of annexation, therefore, necessarily remained in abeyance; but there were other controversies with Mexico in plenty.

In the first place, the settlement of the American claims against Mexico, some of which had been disposed of by arbitration, was still extremely troublesome. It was one thing for Mexico to submit a question to arbitration; but it was quite another thing to pay a judgment when rendered. There were, moreover, a number of claims which, for one reason or another, had not been passed upon in the arbitration, and it was necessary to enter into negotiations for the adjustment of this unfinished business. "These negotiations were complicated by two causes—the Texan question, and the poverty of the Mexican Treasury. The former served to render all intercourse between the two governments difficult and precarious; the latter—the lack of money—rendered the Mexican government unable to discharge its pecuniary obligations either to the United States or to other powers."<sup>3</sup> In the end a new treaty was signed, on January 30, 1843, by which the Mexican government agreed

<sup>1</sup> Van Zandt to Terrell, Dec. 23, 1842; *ibid.*, 633.

<sup>2</sup> Speech at New York, March 15, 1837; Webster's *Works*, I, 356.

<sup>3</sup> Moore, *International Arbitrations*, II, 1245.



to pay the amount of the awards, with interest, within five years, in the city of Mexico, in gold or silver money; and it was also stipulated that a new convention to settle such claims of the two governments and their citizens as were not decided by the late commission should be entered into. The new claims convention contemplated by the treaty of January 30 was concluded on November 20, 1843, but, owing to objections by the American Senate, was never ratified.<sup>1</sup> The claims not passed upon by the former arbitrators were, therefore, left in the air—without any prospect of early settlement. In the meantime, and while these negotiations with respect to the payment of awards and the settlements of the other claims were still pending, the relations between the United States and Mexico were further complicated by acrimonious correspondence growing out of the Santa Fe expedition and the capture of San Antonio by the Mexican forces.<sup>2</sup>

The Santa Fe prisoners had reached the neighborhood of the city of Mexico early in February, 1842, but the tales of their sufferings and of the cruelties practised upon them by Governor Armijo had reached Washington a month before. The relatives and friends of the prisoners, of course, began calling upon the State Department to interpose in their behalf, and Webster wrote urgently to Ellis, who was still the American minister in Mexico, directing him to demand the release of at least such American citizens as were only travellers or traders.<sup>3</sup> But the fears of ill-treatment on the part of the Mexican government led inevitably to suggestions from various quarters that Ellis should be replaced by a more efficient man. Early in the month of January, when the news first came, Senator Preston, of South Carolina, called on Webster and urged that the best and most effectual step in the case of the Santa Fe prisoners would be to send out Waddy Thompson, then a member of the House from South Carolina, in a frigate to Vera Cruz, armed with special instructions concerning the prisoners. Webster approved,

<sup>1</sup> H. R. Docs. 19 and 158, 28 Cong., 2 sess.

<sup>2</sup> See Chapter XIX, above.

<sup>3</sup> Sen. Doc. 325, 27 Cong., 2 sess., 3-8.

and promised to speak to the President on the subject,<sup>1</sup> but it was not until the end of March that the appointment was actually made.

Thompson had been long in Congress, where he was a leader among the Southern Whigs. He had been particularly conspicuous for his hostility to Adams, and for his advocacy, first of the recognition, and then of the annexation of Texas. The Texan minister, writing to his government with that contempt for conventionalities of orthography and punctuation which distinguished many statesmen of the republic, said of Thompson: "He has the character of being a bold fearless enerjetick man a warm friend of Texas."<sup>2</sup> He was indeed so very warm a friend that it might well have been doubted whether he would be regarded as *persona grata* to the Mexican government. Nevertheless, whatever unfavorable anticipations were formed, they were disappointed, and he proved an efficient and successful representative.

His instructions were dated April 5, 1842, and these were followed up after his departure by special instructions, dated April 15, 1842, in which the subject of the Santa Fe prisoners was discussed by Webster, who directed Thompson to make a rather peremptory demand upon the Mexican government.<sup>3</sup> But before the instructions of April 15 reached Mexico all the American citizens who were entitled to a release had been surrendered, and Thompson had no occasion to make the demand in the form directed.

The episode of the Santa Fe prisoners and the tone of definite hostility in American newspaper comments were not at all pleasing to the Mexican authorities, but they were still more incensed when news came of the strong feeling created in the United States by the capture of San Antonio in the month of March, 1842. The anger of Mexico at the popular expressions of sympathy in the United States was so intense as to induce the Minister of Foreign

<sup>1</sup> Amory to Jones, Jan. 15, 1842; *Tex. Dip. Corr.*, I, 527.

<sup>2</sup> Reily to Jones, March 25, 1842; *ibid.*, 546.

<sup>3</sup> The instructions of April 5 are in Sen. Ex. Doc. 325, 27 Cong., 2 sess., 8-17; those of April 15 are printed in full in Webster's *Works*, VI, 427-440.