

cavalry, was to take command in Saltillo. A company of presidial troops was to remain at Laredo, but no other troops were to be detached by Filisola except under express orders from Santa Anna himself.¹

This letter indicated clearly the decision which Santa Anna had reached. He purposed to make Béxar his first objective, and to advance along a nearly straight line from San Luis Potosí by way of Saltillo, Monclova, and the presidio of San Juan Bautista. His decision, which ignored the importance of having a base of supplies on the sea, and indeed ignored the requirement of any base whatever, appears contrary to every principle of the military art. According to Filisola, it was also contrary to the advice of almost all the principal officers of the army, and he asserts that Santa Anna persisted, largely from wrong-headed obstinacy, and a desire to have his own way, aggravated by illness.²

At any rate, there was nothing for Filisola to do but to obey. On January 5, 1836, his movement began. By the sixteenth Ramírez was at the presidio, and by the twenty-first Cos was at Monclova. In the meantime the main body, under Santa Anna, was arriving at Saltillo, where they were joined on the nineteenth by General Urrea with his cavalry. On January 23, 1836, Santa Anna—who had arrived at Saltillo with the first detachment—issued detailed orders for the march. The expeditionary army now amounted, according to the official returns, to 6,019, rank and file, organized in five brigades or detachments, as follows:

1. Vanguard, under General Ramírez y Sesma, numbering 1,541 men (of whom 369 were cavalry), with eight guns.
2. First infantry brigade, under General Gaona, 1,600 men and six guns.
3. Second infantry brigade, under General Tolsa, 1,839 men and six guns—including General Cos's troops.
4. Cavalry brigade, under General Andrade, 437 men.

¹ Filisola, II, 269.

² Santa Anna states that he was in bed for two weeks at Saltillo.—(*Mi Historia*, 33.)

5. Detachment under General Urrea, 300 infantry and 301 cavalry, with one four-pounder gun.

On January 26, 1836, the main body of the army, except Urrea's command, began to march from Saltillo, picking up Cos and his men at Monclova. Urrea was ordered to march from Saltillo to Matamoros, where he was to be joined by 300 men from the Yucatan regiment—who, it seems, had been sent from Campeche by sea—and was to cross the Rio Grande at once, in order to repel any projected attack by the Texans and to guard the right flank of the main body. Urrea left Saltillo on the last day of January, and crossed the river on February 17, 1836. It was his command which, on February 27 and March 2, destroyed the insurgent parties under Johnson and Grant.

Santa Anna himself pushed forward rapidly, overtaking and passing the various brigades, and reached the presidio of San Juan Bautista on February 12. On the same day Ramírez y Sesma, with a force now numbering over sixteen hundred men,¹ crossed the Rio Grande and began the toilsome march to Béxar.

Before leaving the presidio Santa Anna himself wrote to the civil authorities at the capital, asking to be furnished with instructions as to the steps to be taken for the government of Texas after he had reconquered it.² The Secretary of War, on March 18, sent a reply,³ in which he stated that the President and cabinet had carefully examined the grave, difficult, and important questions upon which the commander-in-chief had touched in so masterly a manner, and then proceeded to lay down, under ten different heads, a complete series of provisions for punishing the Texans and rewarding the Mexican soldiers and employees out of the spoils of victory. Briefly, all expenses of putting down the insurrection and all losses incurred thereby, including duties not collected, were to be made up by confiscation of the

¹ He had picked up a few recruits near Laredo and the presidio.—(Filisola, II, 326.)

² See text in Santa Anna's *Manifiesto*, 53-59.

³ Text in Filisola, II, 371-379.

property of the settlers;¹ all the principal promoters of the revolution were to be executed; all foreigners who had come as part of an armed force were to be treated as pirates; all other prisoners were to be dealt with as Congress might direct;² all foreigners who had settled in Texas without lawful passports were to be expelled; and all slaves were to be set free.

These instructions were received by the commander-in-chief about the middle of April, and circumstances occurred soon afterward which rendered the decisions reached by the Mexican government entirely unimportant—except as these decisions threw some light upon the spirit in which they intended to carry on the war. It was probably considerably later when the Texans learned of the officially declared intentions of the government in regard to them. Had they been more promptly informed, they might very well have replied as Henry V is represented to have replied to the French herald before Agincourt:

“Bid them achieve me, and then sell my bones.
Good God! Why should they mock poor fellows thus?
The man that once did sell the lion's skin
While the beast liv'd, was killed with hunting him.”

But Santa Anna, at any rate, was not troubled by any misgivings as to his fate, and he set out from the presidio on the sixteenth of February, hot upon the trail and with every preparation made for disposing of the beast's skin. On the following day he joined the advance under Ramírez y Sesma, and on the twenty-third took possession of the town of Béxar—Travis and his men taking refuge in the Alamo, which they had provisioned as well as possible. Santa Anna

¹ Congress passed a special confiscation act to cover the case of Texas on April 9, 1836.—(Dublan y Lozano, III, 141.)

² On April 14, 1836, Congress passed another law, directing that prisoners taken with arms in their hands and persons who might surrender within a period to be fixed by the commander-in-chief should *not* be executed, but should be banished forever or (in certain cases) should have the option of being confined for ten years within districts to be designated by the government and distant at least seventy leagues from any frontier. The principal agents of the insurrection were excepted from the benefits of the law.—(*Ibid.*, 142.)

contented himself with surrounding the mission buildings while awaiting the arrival of the brigade under Gaona.¹

On the twenty-ninth of February, however, he ordered Ramírez to send out a party to reconnoitre the road toward Gonzales, whence it was supposed that reinforcements for the Texans were advancing. “You know,” wrote Santa Anna to Ramírez, “that *in this war there are no prisoners.*”²

The reconnoissance, which was made in some force,³ was unsuccessful. The troops employed returned to camp on the morning after they left it; but at three o'clock of that same morning thirty-two men from Gonzales had joined the Texans. The number of the defenders of the Alamo was now raised to one hundred and eighty-eight.

The disaster which followed was inevitable. The buildings of the mission of San Antonio de Valero had been constructed about the middle of the eighteenth century. They had later been converted into a military post, but they could not stand against artillery, and even against infantry they could only have been held by a far larger force than that which now occupied them.

The place consisted of a large four-sided corral or yard, about four hundred and fifty feet long from north to south and a hundred and sixty feet wide from east to west. The enclosure was formed partly by stone buildings, and partly by a masonry wall about two feet and a half thick and from nine to twelve feet high. A part of the wall near the north-westerly corner appears to have been in ruins. There were irrigation ditches not far from and nearly parallel to the longer walls, and something like a regular ditch may have existed round the whole *enceinte*. There were no bastions or other means of enfilading the walls.

The middle part of the easterly side of the large enclosure

¹ Santa Anna to Secretary of War, Feb. 27, 1836; Filisola, II, 380. He says in this letter that he had expected to surprise the rebels at dawn of the twenty-second, but that a heavy shower of rain had prevented him.

² “*En esta guerra sabe vd. que no hay prisioneros.*”—(Filisola, II, 387.)

³ A regiment of cavalry and a battalion of infantry. They only went as far as the Espada mission, about eight miles down the river.—(Kennedy, II, 184.)

was formed by the back of the old convent building, two stories high and one hundred and ninety-one feet long. Along the south end of the enclosure was the *cárcel*, or prison, a strong one-story building, with the main gate-way entering through it. On the west side of the enclosure was a range of one-story buildings, also of stone. Back of the old convent building was another yard, about a hundred feet square, surrounded by stout stone walls; and adjoining this at its southeast corner stood the remains of the convent church. This little cruciform structure was about seventy-five feet long and sixty feet wide across the transepts. Its roofless walls were approximately twenty feet high and four feet thick. At the east end of the church an earthen mound or platform had been constructed the previous autumn by General Cos, on which three twelve-pounder guns were mounted, firing through embrasures roughly notched in the masonry.¹ Fourteen guns, or possibly more, were mounted in various parts of the works, but as the Texans were unskilled in the use of artillery, these did not prove to be of much use. The defences were substantially as they had been left by General Cos when he surrendered the previous December.

The garrison was much too small to man walls a quarter of a mile or more long, and, what was worse, it was unorganized and divided into factions. Travis, who had been commissioned a colonel in the "regular" army of Texas, had been sent by Houston to take command; but the volunteers in Béxar declined to serve under him, and elected James Bowie as their commander. To solve the difficulty thus created, the two commanders entered into an extraordinary written agreement, by which Travis was to command so much of the garrison as consisted of regulars and volunteer cavalry, and Bowie was to command the rest, and all orders and correspondence were to be signed by both

¹ See account of the Alamo by Col. R. N. Potter, U. S. A., in *Comp. Hist.*, I, 641, with diagram. A better and more accurate diagram will be found in Corner's *San Antonio de Béxar*. Yoakum has a diagram which appears to be substantially correct, but the dimensions given in his text are erroneous and are contradicted by the diagram.

officers.¹ Bowie, however, fell seriously ill, and Travis was quietly accepted as sole commander.

But notwithstanding the inherent and notorious weakness of the Alamo and its garrison, the stout posture of defence which they presented was enough to render Santa Anna extremely cautious. He had only light field artillery with him, and he hesitated about attempting an assault until Gaona's guns had arrived. A part of Gaona's brigade joined Santa Anna on Friday, the third of March, consisting of a battalion of sappers and the infantry battalions of Aldama and Toluca—in all, eight hundred men or less.²

Santa Anna must now have had under his command somewhere between two thousand and twenty-four hundred men—at a moderate computation a preponderance of twelve to one over the besieged—and an assault was ordered.³ A little before the dawn of Sunday, the sixth of March, three columns attacked—one at the northwest angle of the large enclosure, where a breach existed, another about the middle of the western wall, and the third at the church. The large enclosure was, of course, soon gained. Travis himself was killed early in the fight, and his body was found near the northwest corner.

The Texans, or such as were left of them, fell back on the two-story convent and the church, in both of which a desperate and unavailing fight was kept up by the defenders against enormous odds. One room after another of the convent building was invaded, and the occupants killed. Bowie, who was lying in bed, sick of typhoid pneumonia,⁴ was shot. The church was the last point carried, and every one of its defenders was killed. Not a single man of the Texans was left to tell the story of the siege and assault, and it was from the lips of Mexican soldiers that an American resident

¹ Brown, I, 536.

² Kennedy, II, 184; Filisola, II, 334.

³ The Texans believed that Santa Anna had his full force with him at this time; but the evidence seems quite clear that the rest did not join him until after the assault on the Alamo.—(*Ibid.*, 431.)

⁴ *Comp. Hist.*, I, 643.

at Matamoros, a few weeks afterward, picked up a more or less intelligible statement of the details.¹

Santa Anna's victory was complete; but, in a way, it was worse than a defeat. He had lost a great number of men—how many it is impossible to state. Filisola says "more than" seventy killed and three hundred wounded.² But besides the men, Santa Anna had lost valuable time. He had been delayed by Travis's obstinate and hopeless defence for two weeks—a period of incalculable value to his adversaries. And worse than all, the very dramatic completeness of his victory had turned the world against him. A cause for which nearly two hundred men had literally fought until they died was one to enlist the sympathy of all who heard of their heroic resolution. To defend a post until the last drop of blood, was a figure of speech often employed; but these men, with unheard-of resolution, had actually done the thing itself. "Thermopylæ," said a Texan orator, "Thermopylæ had its messenger of defeat, the Alamo had none"; and the point and vigor of the phrase embodied, in ten words, the feeling of the pride of race with which all English-speaking men learned of the great feat of Travis and his command.³

Santa Anna's next step, having taken the Alamo, was to prepare for a general advance as soon as the whole of his force had joined him. The remaining part of Gaona's brigade, with its guns, arrived on the eighth of March. Tolsa, with the second brigade, and Andrade with the cavalry brigade and the wagons, reached Béxar by the tenth or eleventh of March.⁴ On the latter day the forward movement began, General Ramírez y Sesma, always active, being sent in the direction of Gonzales and San Felipe, with a view to securing the fords of the Colorado: while a detach-

¹ R. M. Potter in *Magazine of Amer. Hist.*, Jan., 1878.

² *Guerra de Tèjas*, II, 389. Santa Anna gives seventy dead and about three hundred wounded.—(*Manifesto*, 10.)

³ The best evidence seems to be that the famous phrase was first uttered by Edward Burleson in a speech at Gonzales, when the news of the fall of the Alamo reached that place.—(*Tex. Hist. Quar.*, VI, 309; VII, 328.)

⁴ Filisola, II, 431.

ment of about six hundred men, under the command of Colonel Morales, was ordered to Goliad to reinforce the right wing of the army under Urrea.¹

Urrea, after his easy triumphs over the little parties of Johnson and Grant, had halted at San Patricio, where he remained, probably waiting for orders from Santa Anna, until the twelfth of March. He then pushed forward to Refugio, reaching the site of the mission after two days' march. There he found a party of insurgents under Major Ward, of Georgia, holding the church. Ward repulsed Urrea's attack that afternoon, but retreated in the night, intending to join Fannin, who was still holding Goliad.

Next day Urrea also started for Goliad, picking up on the way Captain King, one of Fannin's officers, with a detachment of forty-seven men. Of these, sixteen were killed in action, and the remaining thirty-one were made prisoners and then shot. "The fatigue of the troops, in consequence of their constant marching," says the Mexican historian of the war, "the number of prisoners—which was now much increased—the want of means for keeping and feeding them, and finally, the orders of the supreme government and the latest orders from the commander-in-chief, compelled General Urrea to yield to difficult circumstances, although contrary to his own intentions, and to order some thirty adventurers to be shot"; and Filisola goes on to argue, that although Urrea's conduct had been blamed, he was really quite right in extirpating "these hordes of assassins and thieves."²

Pushing rapidly forward, Urrea interposed a part, if not all of his force, between Ward and Fannin, and was joined by Morales with the reinforcements from Béxar on the seventeenth of March, raising his force to about twelve hundred men. Two days afterward Fannin, too late, began his retreat.

¹ Goliad was originally the presidio de la Bahía del Espíritu Santo. The buildings were almost a duplicate of those at the Alamo. It was occupied at this time by about four or five hundred volunteers under Col. J. W. Fannin.—(*Comp. Hist.*, I, 613.)

² "Nada más natural que el que se estirpasen estas hordas de asesinos y ladrones."—(Filisola, II, 419.)

He had received orders from Houston on the fourteenth of March to fall back to Victoria as soon as practicable, with "such artillery as can be brought *with expedition*," to sink the rest in the river, and to afford every facility to women and children desirous of leaving the place. "The immediate advance of the enemy may be confidently expected," Houston added, "as well as a rise of water. *Prompt movements are therefore highly important.*"¹ That Fannin delayed moving for five days after receipt of this order was, perhaps, excusable, in view of the continued absence of Ward and King with a hundred and fifty men. A more serious disobedience of orders was his determination to remove all his artillery, so that, when he finally started on the morning of March 19, he was encumbered not only by a following of non-combatants, but also by a train of ox-carts.

About the middle of that day Fannin was overtaken by Urrea's cavalry in an open prairie, some five miles from the Coleta River. Unable to advance, he was soon surrounded by Urrea's whole command, which outnumbered the Texan force about four to one. All that afternoon and until well into the night a bitter fight went on, the Texans sheltering behind their carts and the dead bodies of their cattle; the Mexicans constantly attacking with horse and foot, and both sides suffering rather severely.

By next morning, Sunday, March 20, Fannin realized that his position was hopeless. He was five miles from water, his animals had been killed, and he had a number of women and children, besides his wounded, whom he was not willing to desert, and he determined to surrender. He therefore displayed a white flag, and Urrea sent three officers—Colonel Morales, Colonel Salas, and Lieutenant-Colonel Holzinger—to negotiate terms of surrender. Fannin asked for assurances that his men should be treated as prisoners of war, and a written agreement to that effect was drawn up on his behalf. According to Colonel Holzinger, this proposition was referred to General Urrea, although the

¹ Yoakum, II, 472. Italics are not in the original. The orders were dated March 11.

orders of the government were well known to his three representatives. The answer was that no agreement to that effect could be made, but that private assurances might be given to Fannin that he (Urrea) would use his influence with the government to spare their lives, and that until the reply of the government was received, they should be treated as prisoners of war. Fannin said to the Mexicans: "Gentlemen, do you believe the Mexican government will spare our lives?" to which the commissioners answered that, although they could give no positive promise, yet there was no example of the Mexican government having ordered the shooting of a prisoner who had appealed to its clemency; and thereupon Fannin surrendered, without any papers having been signed by the Mexicans.¹

Urrea's own account of the surrender only differs from this in one material point. In his diary, published a year later, he says that he gave Fannin the assurance that he would interpose in his behalf *with the commander-in-chief*, and accordingly did so, in a letter from Victoria.² From Victoria he also wrote to the officer in command of the guard at Goliad, directing him to treat the prisoners with consideration, and particularly Fannin.³

The rank and file of Fannin's force, who were not, perhaps, accurately informed as to what had passed in the conferences, were certainly convinced that the Mexicans (whom they naturally mistrusted) had consented to definite terms

¹ Letter from Holzinger to John A. Wharton, June 3, 1836, in Caro's *Verdadera Idea*, 73-78.

² Urrea, *Diario*, 17. This letter is not published, but Santa Anna's reply will be found at page 60, in which he argues the case at some length, and says the indignation of the nation would fall on him if he protected such highway robbers. "I yield to no one, my friend," he continues, "in tender-heartedness, for I am not aware that I hate any man, and I have never had a thought of avenging even personal injuries; but what authority have I to overrule what the government of the nation has in terms commanded, by remitting the penalty for such criminals as these foreigners?" If, instead of Santa Anna's ordering the prisoners to be executed, the question had been referred to the city of Mexico, an answer would not have been received till the end of April; and by that time Santa Anna had ordered all surviving prisoners released, in spite of the directions of the supreme government.

³ "Trate V. con consideración á los prisioneros, principalmente á su gefe Fanning."—(Urrea, *Diario*, 62.)

of capitulation, under which they were to be treated as prisoners of war and be sent back to the United States. Their treatment at first confirmed this belief. They were sent back to Goliad, including all the wounded, and here they were shortly joined by Ward and his men, who were captured on Monday, the twenty-first, and by eighty-two men fresh from the United States, who had been taken as they landed at Copano. There were in all about five hundred prisoners, almost all of them volunteers from the United States. They were guarded by about two hundred Mexican infantry, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Portilla, Urrea himself having marched forward from the field of Fannin's surrender direct to Victoria.

About seven o'clock in the evening of the following Saturday (March 26), Portilla received a despatch from Santa Anna, expressing surprise that the prisoners should have been sent to Goliad at all, recalling the order of the government that all foreigners taken with arms in their hands should be treated as pirates, and directing that the prisoners should all be immediately shot.¹

Portilla, after some hesitation (as he asserted later), determined to comply with Santa Anna's very positive command. The eighty-two men taken at Copano, however, he thought were not included in the order, and four American surgeons, with some other men, who were saved by the connivance of Mexican officers or the kindly intercession of a Mexican lady, were also spared. In all about a hundred and twelve men were excepted.²

Early on the morning of Palm Sunday, those who were not in the hospital, numbering over three hundred, were mustered, with their knapsacks on their backs, divided into three separate parties, and marched out in different directions on the prairie. The men were in high spirits, for they believed they were going home. About half a mile from the presidio they were formed in line with the Mexican escort facing them. Even then they did not understand what was

¹ For the text of this order see Urrea, *Diario*, 60.

² See Portilla's reports, *ibid.*, 61-63.

going on. As one survivor related, while they stood there, somebody suddenly cried out: "Boys, they're going to shoot," and then the slaughter began.

The details of this horrible business need not be gone into, but it is enough to say that of the men thus marched out every one was put to death except a few who ran the moment they saw they were to be murdered. The troops employed in the execution then went back into Goliad, dragged the wounded out of the barracks, and put them to death. Fannin himself, who was among the wounded, was the last man shot. In all, about three hundred and fifty-seven men were executed. Their bodies were burned.¹

If the evidence of Urrea and Holzinger is to be believed, the guilt of this atrocious butchery of prisoners, a week after they had surrendered, lay solely at Santa Anna's door. "Every soldier in my division," wrote Urrea, "was confounded at the news; all was amazement and consternation. . . . They [Fannin's men] certainly surrendered in the belief that Mexican generosity would not make their sacrifice sterile; for if they had thought otherwise they would have resisted to the last, and sold their lives as dearly as possible."² It is to be noted, however, that Urrea, when his diary was published, was hostile to the government, that he did not publish the text of his report to Santa Anna, and that the latter may not have been fully and fairly informed of the circumstances of the surrender. But whatever the degree of Santa Anna's guilt, there can be no question that his act was an amazing blunder. This cold-blooded slaughter aroused a spirit of vengeance which was not to be lightly satisfied, and which wrought infinite mischief to Mexico in the long run.

¹ Accounts by two of the surgeons who were spared and by some of those who were ordered out for execution, but escaped, will be found in Foote, II, 227; *Comp. Hist.*, I, 608; *Tex. Hist. Quar.*, I, 54; Baker, 144, 244. Andrew A. Boyle, one of the Irish settlers at San Patricio, was wounded but was left in the hospital through the personal intervention of General Garay, and saw his companions shot in the hospital yard. His account is in *Tex. Hist. Quar.*, XIII, 285-291. The most careful calculation of the number put to death is in Brown, I, 624.

² Urrea, *Diario*, 22.

It is no more than just to the Mexican commander to recall that his course was in full accord with Spanish and Mexican precedents. The royalists and the insurgents, like Calleja at Guanajuato, and Hidalgo at Valladolid, from the very beginning of the war of independence, had made it their constant practice to shoot their prisoners.¹ At Guadalajara, the patriot priest Hidalgo caused a body of Spanish prisoners to be marched out of the city to a lonely spot, and there butchered; "and on other occasions the same ceremony was repeated."² At Zipimeo, in September, 1812, the royalist general, Castillo, put more than three hundred prisoners to death; and a few days after a hundred more were drawn up in line and shot, all but one man, who was dismissed to bear the tidings to his countrymen.³ In August, 1817, the royalist general Liñan captured a fort, and all the sick and wounded in the hospital were dragged out and shot. The unwounded prisoners were made to work for three days restoring the fortifications, and when they were no longer needed for that purpose, they were shot also.⁴

These, though conspicuous, were not isolated instances. It was the general rule, during the revolutionary war, that if any prisoners had been taken on either side, they were forthwith shot;⁵ and these were the standing orders, at least on the part of the royalists. On November 23, 1811, Calleja, then commander-in-chief, and afterward viceroy of New Spain, issued a proclamation announcing that all who were taken with arms in their hands were to be shot.⁶ And

¹ Bancroft, *History of Mexico*, IV, 226, 230.

² *Ibid.*, 249.

³ *Ibid.*, 337. And see for other examples of wholesale butcheries, *ibid.*, 268, 311, 317, 321, 349, 355, 372, 571, etc.

⁴ Robinson, *Mina's Expedition* (Am. ed.), 207.

⁵ Of Pedro Celestino Negrete, a Spanish officer, it was reported that not one insurgent prisoner captured by him had ever escaped death.—(Bancroft, *History of Mexico*, IV, 387.)

⁶ Calleja believed that citizens of the United States were encouraging the revolution. He caught one of them at the bridge of Calderon, a certain Simon Fletcher, a captain of artillery, who was badly wounded. "*Era tal el deseo de Calleja de fusilar á alguno de los de aquella nacion,*" says Alaman, "*que andaban fomentando la revolucion, que para ejecutarlo se le sacó del hospital en donde estaba.*"—(*Historia de Méjico*, II, 154.) It was an exact precedent for the murder of Fannin.

a little later General José de la Cruz, in his orders to a subordinate, expressly directed that he must not spare the life of any rebel, no matter of what class, condition, or age he might be.¹

It was also declared by the Spanish Cortes to be contrary to its own majesty and dignity to confirm any capitulation with insurgents;² and accordingly, even where surrenders were made on the express condition that the lives of the prisoners should be spared, the condition was repeatedly violated. The insurgents were as faithless as the royalists. When Tasco surrendered in December, 1811, Morelos, a week later, ordered that the terms of surrender be disregarded, and the prisoners were shot.³ Tehuacan capitulated under a guarantee that the lives of all the royalists should be spared, "to which stipulation, according to custom, not the slightest attention was subsequently paid."⁴

The Spaniards practised similar barbarities in their wars at home. As late as August, 1834, General Rodil—who had indeed learned his trade in the revolution in Chile—issued a proclamation condemning all Carlists and their abettors to death; and Zumálcarrégui, the Carlist leader, answered by ordering that all prisoners, of whatever grade, be executed.

It may well be supposed, therefore, that Santa Anna never anticipated the strong expression of horror and resentment which was manifested in foreign nations at the manner in which he waged war. The school in which he was bred had taught, and the nation from which he was descended was practising, the doctrine that the wholesale slaughter of disarmed insurgents was the proper way to suppress rebellion.

¹ Bancroft, *Mexico*, IV, 324; and see Beltrami, *Le Mexique*, I, 346.

² Decree of April 10, 1813.

³ Bancroft, *Mexico*, IV, 350.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 398. Other examples of the same disregard of pledges will be found in Robinson, *Mina's Expedition*, 177-188.