

property, the beggarly million, which was all that Adams offered for a purchase, should have been thought too little.

At any rate, Poinsett made no progress whatever in inducing the Mexican government to consider modifying the boundary line as fixed by the Florida treaty. The United States government explicitly declared that it regarded that treaty as binding both on itself and Mexico, as was indeed perfectly apparent;¹ but still public opinion was so morbidly sensitive on this point that when the treaty of commerce was under discussion in the Mexican Congress, in 1827, the Chamber of Deputies adopted a resolution in the following terms:

"This Chamber will not take into consideration the treaty which the Government has concluded with that of the United States of America, until an article shall be inserted in it recognizing the validity of that which was entered into by the cabinet of Madrid, in the year 1819, with the Government of Washington, respecting the limits of the territories of the two contracting parties."²

The Mexican plenipotentiaries, therefore, when Poinsett took up again the discussion of the treaty of commerce, told him that before advancing a step further the boundary line of 1819 must be explicitly confirmed. There was obviously no objection to this, but Poinsett suggested it would be better to make a separate agreement on the subject; to which proposal the Mexican plenipotentiaries consented.³ Four days later, on January 12, 1828, a treaty was signed which declared that the boundaries between the two countries were the same as agreed upon by the treaty with Spain of February 22, 1819, and that the United States and Mexico would at once proceed to carry into full effect the provisions for surveying and marking the line.⁴

Ratifications of this treaty were to be exchanged in Washington within four months, and the papers were duly sub-

¹ *Amer. St. Papers, For. Rel.*, VI, 580.

² H. R. Doc. 42, 25 Cong., 1 sess., 26.

³ Poinsett thought that the proposal for a confirmation of the treaty of 1819 was intended to entrap him, and that the Mexican authorities were surprised and disappointed when he made no objection.—(*Ibid.*, 26-29.)

⁴ See text in English and Spanish in *Amer. St. Papers, For. Rel.*, VI, 946.

mitted to the United States Senate on April 21, 1828, or three weeks before the end of the period. The treaty was approved by that body on April 28. Mexico, however, was dilatory. The treaty received the necessary approval of the Mexican Congress, but the ratification was not despatched from Mexico until May 10, just two days before the time expired for its delivery in Washington.¹ It was not until August 2, 1828, that the Mexican minister notified the State Department of his readiness to proceed to an exchange of ratifications; but as the time limited by the treaty had expired nearly three months before, the President of the United States had lost his authority to act until further action by the Senate, and when Congress again met, in December, the business of the treaty of commerce with Mexico was still unfinished and Adams had been defeated for re-election. Under these circumstances he did not choose to resubmit the boundary treaty to the Senate, and he went out of office in March, 1829, leaving the whole subject just where it was on the day of his inauguration.²

Political conditions in Mexico were meantime growing worse from day to day, and divisions were becoming more complicated. In addition to the Escoceses and Yorkinos, there came into existence a third faction which may be called the Pedraza party. Don Manuel Gómez Pedraza, President Victoria's Secretary of War, the creator and leader of the new faction, was a native Mexican of Spanish descent, and like Iturbide and many other Mexican politicians had been an officer in the Spanish army. He was as active and energetic as Victoria was the reverse. Originally a member of a Scottish lodge, he joined the Yorkinos when they came into existence; and he then set to work to build up a personal machine of his own.

His official policy was one of conciliation. Three or four small risings took place in various parts of the country, but no vigorous attempt was made by the government to

¹ H. R. Doc. 351, 25 Cong., 2 sess., 202.

² The ratifications were finally exchanged April 5, 1832. See H. R. Doc. 42, 25 Cong., 1 sess., 46-50, as to causes for delay.

suppress them, Pedraza asserting that to do so would awaken a general civil war. These isolated attempts soon broke down from their own weakness, but they were obviously the precursors of more serious revolts with which the government might find it extremely difficult to deal, for the very simple reason that it was always in the army itself that these disturbances began.

"Some generals and many officers," said Pedraza, "obeyed the factions rather than the President. The right of petition was confused with insurrection, and whoever had influence anywhere took up arms to demand whatever the clubs in the capital decided on."¹

The basis of most of these *pronunciamientos* was the demand that all Spaniards should be expelled from Mexico, a demand that now found a certain added support in the fact that Spain, feebly and ineffectually, but with some noisy ostentation, was preparing a military and naval expedition against Mexico. The state legislatures took up the popular cry and one after another passed laws expelling the Spaniards—laws which the federal Congress was at first disposed to declare unconstitutional. But the public demands, especially when made by bodies of armed men, were much too insistent to be disregarded. On December 20, 1827, a federal law was adopted by which a partial measure of expulsion was put in force.²

Three days later a new and more serious disturbance broke out at the village of Otumba. The real leader of this revolt was no less a personage than the leader of the Escoceses, the Vice-President of the republic, General Don Nicolas Bravo.³ The sole object sought to be attained was to put

¹ "El derecho de petición fué confundido con los levantamientos, y cualquiera que tenía influencia en algún territorio, tomaba las armas para demandar lo que disponían los clubs de la capital."—(Pedraza's Manifesto, quoted by Suarez, *Historia de México*, 83.)

² Dublan y Lozano, II, 47.

³ Bravo justified his course by saying that the government itself had opened the way, since in the events which had preceded and accompanied the decree of expulsion of the Spaniards it had unequivocally authorized the right of "armed petition"—"autorizó de un modo inequívoco el derecho de petición armada."—(Suarez, *Historia de México*, 89, note 2.)

the Escoceses in power; but the nominal demands were concisely stated as follows: 1. The passage of a law by Congress prohibiting secret societies. 2. Dismissal of all the ministers, "placing in each department men of acknowledged probity, virtue, and merit." 3. Expulsion of Mr. Poinsett.¹ 4. Strict observance of the Constitution.²

This time the Yorkinos found that they were able to count upon an adequate military force, and Pedraza set upon Bravo with such vigor that within a fortnight he and most of his followers were safely in jail. There were also isolated mutinies of garrisons in the states of Vera Cruz and San Luis Potosí, but these were easily put down. In a month the whole affair was at an end, the prisoners were tried and, instead of being shot, were banished. This very unusual conclusion of the revolt was due to Pedraza, who thought it "good politics" to exert clemency toward the defeated Escoceses, a course of conduct which resulted in bringing down on him the hatred of the more violent of the Yorkinos.

The election of 1828 for President was now rapidly approaching, and Pedraza's efforts were all directed toward getting himself chosen. The Escoceses were powerless since their leaders had been banished, and were glad to join in a coalition which Pedraza managed to form between them and the more moderate Yorkinos; and in aid of this combination the whole government patronage was freely and very openly used.

The regular Yorkino candidate and the leader of the faction was General Guerrero, a half-breed Indian, who had been a defeated candidate in 1824. He was the son of poor parents, and was wholly without education. When about

¹ The demand for Poinsett's expulsion was no new thing. The legislatures of several of the states had passed resolutions more than six months before calling on the government to expel him. Victoria, as usual, was undecided and ineffectual, although Poinsett in a personal interview insisted that he ought to take a definite position.—(Poinsett to Adams, June 8, 1827; same to same, July 18, 1827; Zavala to Poinsett, June 16, 1827—all in *Poinsett MSS.*)

² The full text is given in Suarez, 90. See English translation in Ward's *Mexico*, II, 565; as also the President's proclamation on that occasion and Bravo's Manifesto, *ibid.*, 571, 574.

eighteen years old, at the time when the standard of independence was first raised, he had joined the insurgents, and, like Victoria, he never was made a prisoner and never asked a pardon. Even in the darkest days of the long revolutionary struggle he was the leader of a little unconquered body of men who kept alive the cause of independence in Southern Mexico, and his personal bravery and enthusiasm were unquestioned. He believed firmly in the equality of all men, especially of Indians and white men, and he hated kings and priests, but he had none of the qualifications needed to administer the simplest public affairs.¹

Before Iturbide openly mutinied he had thought it wise to secure Guerrero's support. Guerrero, however, was one of the first to revolt against the Emperor, and was severely wounded in the short struggle against the imperial forces. He was, as already stated, grand master of the Yorkino lodges, and as a hero with an organization at his back, possessed every qualification necessary to make him the figure-head of the party. The capacity to steer the ship must needs be found elsewhere.

The contrast between the two presidential candidates was striking. Guerrero was an ignorant half-breed, who had risen to eminence solely because he had been a noted insurgent leader all through the obscure fighting of the war of independence. Pedraza was in every respect his opposite. He was an educated white man, an old servant of the crown of Spain, a steady opponent of the revolution, and possessed of every advantage of ability and training; and he entirely dominated Victoria's cabinet.

No method of persuasion or intimidation which the government could employ to advance his candidacy seems to have been omitted. But a certain inexperience in the art of controlling elections seems to have allowed the working of the machinery to be too plainly seen, and a large part of the ruling classes became persuaded that if Guerrero were

¹ Alaman, who was an enemy of Guerrero, says of him: "*Nunca se le había empleado ni en la regencia ni en el consejo de estado, pues aunque tenía bastante penetración y buen sentido natural, su falta de instrucción era tan absoluta, que apenas sabía firmar su nombre.*"—(*Historia de Méjico*, V, 766.)

beaten it could only be through unfair means. In the result Pedraza was elected. Of the nineteen states then existing, ten voted for him, eight for Guerrero, and in one (Durango) the legislature did not vote.

The moment the result was known a military mutiny broke out. A small body of troops stationed at Jalapa proclaimed themselves a "liberating army," and under the lead of General Santa Anna, a young officer who had already had a stormy career, marched on Perote and took possession of that fortress. On September 16, 1828, they issued a pronunciamiento, in which they declared that Pedraza was a secret enemy of his country, and that in voting for him the state legislatures had disregarded the general wish of the people. "The name of the hero of the South," said the proclamation, "is repeated with unspeakable enthusiasm. His valor and constancy combined, have engraved upon the hearts of the Mexicans the image of their felicity. They wish to confide to him the delicate and sacred deposit of the Executive Power."

Protesting their unalterable devotion to the Constitution which they were openly violating, the mutineers set forth the following plan: 1. "The People and the army" were to annul the election of Pedraza. 2. A law for the expulsion of Spaniards was to be passed. 3. Guerrero was to be declared President. 4. The legislatures who had voted against Pedraza must immediately proceed to a new election, "in conformity with the wish of their constituents."¹

At first it seemed that the government would have little difficulty in suppressing this mutiny. Congress on September 17, 1828, declared Santa Anna an outlaw,² and a competent body of troops was sent to capture him. He extricated himself, however, from the indefensible position of Perote, and, marching south, shut himself up in Guerrero's country of Oaxaca, and ceased to be a factor in the situation.³

While Santa Anna was thus isolated, Guerrero's friends,

¹ Suarez, 109. An English translation is given in Ward's *Mexico*, II, 582.

² Dublan y Lozano, II, 79.

³ Suarez, 112-126, 131.

who seem to have used Santa Anna as a cat's-paw, took advantage of the reduction of the garrison in the city of Mexico to organize a revolt of their own. On the night of November 30, 1828, they seized the Acordada prison, and after three or four days of vicious street fighting completely defeated the government troops. The members of the cabinet fled, and the supporters of Guerrero amused themselves by looting the shops in the Parian, on the pretence that the proprietors were all Spaniards.¹

President Victoria, incapable to the last, surrendered to the insurgents, and was thenceforward a puppet in their hands. Guerrero was made Minister of War, *vice* Pedraza resigned, and the other places were filled by Yorkino nominees. Pedraza, impelled, as his friends asserted, by a patriotic desire to prevent a civil war, and also doubtless by well-founded fears for his life, renounced all claims to the Presidency and went to England. Everywhere the military commanders pronounced in favor of the expulsion of the Spaniards and the election of Guerrero. And finally Congress ratified the accomplished fact by a declaration that Guerrero had been duly elected President and Anastasio Bustamante Vice-President of the republic.

The immediate effect of this successful revolution, the third in less than eight years, was to put the offices completely in the hands of the Yorkinos. A more remote effect was to create a difficult diplomatic situation by reason of the claims of numerous foreigners for damages caused by the destruction of their property, especially in the shops of the Parian.² And the reports of mob rule in the streets of the capital were enough to discourage foreigners from coming into the country upon any terms.

¹ The Parian was a part of the great public square in which a number of small ugly shops had been allowed to be constructed. It was entirely removed by the public authorities in 1842 or 1843. See map in Bullock's *Mexico*. Guerrero was accused of having publicly encouraged the looting. "*Hijos! Para Ustedes es el Parian!*" (Boys, the Parian is yours!) he is reported to have shouted to the crowd from a window in the Acordada.—(Ward's *Mexico*, II, 610.)

² The loss of property was estimated at as high a figure as \$2,000,000, and more than twenty years after the event the Mexican Congress voted an indemnity.—(Rivera, *Historia de Jalapa*, II, 508.)

But the most important and far-reaching result was the establishment of the fatal precedent that a party, defeated at an ordinary election, might always appeal to the army in order to reverse the decision of the electors rendered in due legal form. Both of the two previous successful revolutions had been based upon a proposed change in the form of government. The plan of Iguala looked to the establishment of an independent empire. The revolution which overthrew Iturbide, was intended to substitute a republic for the empire. The revolt of the Acordada on the contrary, was conducted by men who professed the most zealous attachment to the existing institutions of the country, and who opposed Pedraza simply because they personally disliked him and asserted that most people agreed with them. Of course their real reason, it might almost be said their professed reason, was because their particular faction could not expect from Pedraza any of the patronage or other opportunities which the party in power had to distribute. The villainy thus taught their opponents, the latter were certain sooner or later to execute, and even to better the instruction.

Meanwhile, the winter passed by peaceably; Santa Anna's outlawry was reversed and complete amnesty was voted to all who had "pronounced";¹ and on Wednesday, the first day of April, 1829, General Guerrero was inaugurated as President. Four weeks earlier General Andrew Jackson had been inaugurated at Washington as President of the United States.

Guerrero, who had taken the sword, soon perished with the sword, but his fall was delayed by a piece of undeserved good luck. The long threatened Spanish invasion was at last attempted, but with forces so utterly inadequate as to insure an easy victory to Mexico and temporary glory to the administration of the day.

The whole conduct of the invading expedition was as stupid and ill-considered a piece of business as anything that the government of Ferdinand VII ever attempted.

¹ Dublan y Lozano, II, 97.

Something like thirty-five hundred European troops sailed from Havana on the first of July, 1829, at the worst season of the year, to conquer a population of seven millions. The commanders of the naval vessels that convoyed the transports did not feel strong enough to attempt an attack on the fortifications of Vera Cruz, and after the Spanish troops had been put ashore on the beach near Tampico, in the middle of the rainy season, the ships returned to Havana.

Spain having thus deliberately abandoned control of the sea, it was easy for the Mexicans to bring up men both by sea and land; and after a certain amount of skirmishing in which the invaders were generally successful, the wretched remnant of the Spanish forces surrendered to General Santa Anna on September 11, 1829. Fever had been far more formidable than the Mexican arms. Nearly half of the Spanish expedition perished.¹

In despatching so inadequate a force to Mexico, the government of Ferdinand VII was acting under the delusion that a majority of the Mexican people were tired of the republic, and were desirous of renewing their allegiance to Spain. It was believed that a small military force, landing on Mexican soil, would serve as a nucleus around which would gather all those who were hostile to the existing state of things, and that a march to the capital would prove an easy triumph. There was, however, an abundance of recent historical examples to demonstrate the folly of sending an insufficient invading force into an enemy's country, depending upon the hope of a local rising to help it out.² The preposterous failure of the long-heralded Spanish expedition not only served to emphasize this military maxim, but it showed the world how groundless was the belief that the Mexican people generally desired to return to their former condition of colonial dependence.

The popular hero of the occasion was, of course, Santa Anna, who had exhibited great promptitude and efficiency

¹ General Mier y Terán, who was left by Santa Anna in charge of the prisoners, reported that only 1,792 men had been sent back to Cuba.—(Suarez, 160.)

² See Mahan's *Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution*, I, 97, 119.

in collecting and transporting his little army, without help from the federal government. The authorities in the city of Mexico, on the other hand, had failed to rise to the height of their opportunities, or perhaps it would be more accurate to say, had made the poorest possible use of them, although the Mexican Congress had seen fit to put the most extraordinary powers into the President's hands. By an act passed August 25, 1829, he had been authorized to adopt whatever measures might be necessary to preserve independence and public tranquillity.¹ These powers, which were conferred without any express warrant in the Constitution, were to cease upon the reassembling of Congress.

The clique surrounding Guerrero evidently concluded that the possession of this little brief authority was something to be utilized without delay, and they accordingly proceeded to promulgate in his name a series of edicts which may not have made the angels weep, but which certainly made the Mexicans extremely angry. Their remarkable legislation had, for the most part, no relation whatever to the contest with Spain. On the contrary, the greater part of it was directed toward ameliorating the condition of mankind in general. Gambling-houses were regulated, and so was the coinage of copper and the method of filling vacant bishoprics. A complete system of statistics was to be created. The death penalty was suspended. Slavery was abolished. A sinking fund was established, as well as a national soldiers' home (*Casa Nacional de Inválidos*). The mining laws, the diplomatic service, the mint, the pawn shops, and the government of the Federal District were all attended to. But what chiefly exasperated public opinion, were two decrees providing that any one who calumniously attacked the executive of the nation or of any state, might be proceeded against under administrative process, or, in other words, might be punished without a trial.²

In the middle of November, 1829, the garrisons in Yuca-

¹ "Se autoriza al ejecutivo de la Federación para adoptar cuantas medidas sean necesarias á la conservación de la independencia, del sistema actual de gobierno y de la tranquilidad pública."—(Dublan y Lozano, II, 151.)

² Decrees of Sept. 4 and 11, 1829; Dublan y Lozano, II, 156, 160.

tan began a revolution, and a few days later Bustamante, the Vice-President, who had been put in command of a reserve army numbering three thousand men, with headquarters at Jalapa, followed suit. His proclamation announced that he and the army under his command were resolved to destroy the national government in order to preserve the Constitution and the laws, and that those officials who had failed to conform to public opinion would be dismissed and their places filled by the conquering patriots (*patriotas vencedores*). Nothing could be more frank. Bustamante and his friends wanted the offices, and announced that they meant to take them.

Within three weeks, the administration was overthrown and Guerrero himself was a fugitive. Bustamante naturally succeeded to the *de-facto* position of President and early in February, 1830, he procured the passage of an act of Congress which formally deposed Guerrero upon the ground of incapacity ("*imposibilidad para gobernar la República*").¹

Anastasio Bustamante, who was thenceforward for several years a conspicuous figure in the rapidly shifting scenes of the Mexican drama, was in his fiftieth year. He was a white man, well educated, and had served in the Spanish army until Iturbide's mutiny. Originally he had studied medicine and had begun to practise that profession; but at the first symptoms of the approaching struggle for independence, he had entered the royal army. By 1821 he had risen to the rank of colonel. Iturbide promoted and decorated him, and Victoria made him a major-general. In the spring of 1826, he had been placed in command of the forces on the northeastern frontier, which included Texas, and had managed to keep the peace with the Indians, and with the very few Texan colonists who were then in the country. He was, on the whole, a weak man, but he managed to secure the respect and support of abler and stronger men.

When he first became President² he surrounded himself

¹ *Ibid.*, 223.

² He did not assume the title. He was always officially designated as *El Excelentísimo Señor Vice-Presidente*.

with an energetic cabinet, and his administration was not unsuccessful. The financial and industrial condition of the country was improved, and order was preserved with a stern and bloody hand. His object may best be described as the establishment of a military despotism. The opponents of his administration were imprisoned, banished, or shot. The press was effectually muzzled. The army in general was well paid and its officers encouraged. The church also was not neglected. And if there had only been offices enough to satisfy everybody, there was no reason why Bustamante's administration should not have continued indefinitely.