

order too, by which the innocent were confounded with the guilty, was revoked before the troops had penetrated beyond the suburbs; and I do not find that the authors, who are most zealous in the cause of the Revolution, can prove the number of those who really suffered by the sentence of decimation, pronounced afterwards against a part of the population, to have been greater than that of the Europeans, who had fallen victims to their ferocity. Besides, it must not be forgotten that, at the commencement of a Revolution, however just its causes, all those who engage in open hostilities against the established government, do it at their own peril. They must expect to be treated as traitors, until success makes heroes of them. I do not blame the Spanish Authorities so much for having done, in the first instance, what most governments would have done in their place, as I do, for having persevered in their system of severity, when time had proved its inefficacy, and when they were intreated by the Insurgents themselves, to avoid such an unnecessary effusion of blood.

Hidalgo arrived at Valladolid on the 14th of November, from whence, after allowing three days for his followers to recruit after their late losses, he proceeded, without delay, to Guădălăxără, which town had been occupied by one of his lieutenants, on the very day, that the battle of Ācŭlcŏ was lost by himself. During this short stay at Valladolid, he was joined by another man, who, afterwards,

took a very active part in the Revolution, the advocate (el licēnciădŏ) Don Ignăciŏ Lŏpěz Răyŏn, whom Hidalgo immediately appointed his confidential secretary: Răyŏn is one of those who did most towards reducing the Insurrection to a regularly organized system; he established the Junta of Zităcuărŏ, which was the first step taken towards creating an independent government, and gave to the Patriot cause a character of respectability, which it had not before possessed.

On the 24th of November, Hidalgo made a triumphal entry into Guădălăxără, where he was received with the greatest pomp, and, apparently, with the greatest enthusiasm. Although the excommunication originally pronounced against him had not been taken off, he assisted at a grand *Te Deum*, in the Cathedral, from whence he was conducted to the palace, where all the great Corporations came to place themselves at his orders. Soon after his arrival he was joined by Āllēndě, in conjunction with whom, though a great degree of irritation had existed between them since the retreat from Mexico, he proceeded, with his usual activity, to take measures for increasing his forces, and replacing the artillery which he had lost. This he effected, by bringing a number of cannon from Săn Blăs, (the great dock-yard and arsenal of the Spaniards, on the Western coast;) some of which, though of a very large size, (24-pounders) were conveyed, by the Indians, over a mountainous dis-



trict, across which no communication had ever before been thought practicable. It would have been well for Hidalgo's reputation, if these cares alone had occupied him; but, during his stay in Guădă-lăxără, he was guilty of an action, which leaves a foul blot upon his name. I have already remarked his inexorable spirit, and his bitter enmity towards every thing Spanish. All the Europeans in the town were thrown into confinement, upon his arrival: their number was so great, that it was necessary to distribute them amongst the different convents; and it is not improbable that they may not have been as guarded in their conversation there, as circumstances required. But, without any other crime being alleged against them than this,—on some vague rumours of a conspiracy amongst the prisoners, Hidalgo determined to make away with them all. This cruel resolution was carried into effect with a cold-bloodedness which is really horrible.

No form of trial, no previous examination even, was thought necessary; but the prisoners were brought out, by twenty and thirty at a time, and conducted, under the veil of night, by some of Hidalgo's creatures, to retired parts of the mountains in the vicinity of the city, where they were butchered in secret, the use of fire-arms being prohibited, for fear of creating any alarm. This detestable system of midnight executions commenced at Valladolid, where Hidalgo ordered eighty Europeans to be be-

headed on the Cerro de la Bătăă, during the three days which he passed in the town; but, in Guădă-lăxără, the number of victims was between seven and eight hundred. There is every reason to believe too, that he intended to pursue the same line of conduct in future, and to establish it as a general rule amongst his adherents; for a letter was produced on his trial, written by him to one of his lieutenants, in which, after recommending him to go on seizing the persons of as many Spaniards as possible, he adds, "and if you should have any reason to suspect your prisoners of entertaining restless, or seditious, ideas, or discover amongst them, any dangerous intentions, *bury them in oblivion at once*, by putting such persons to death, with all necessary precautions, in some secret and solitary place, where their fate may remain for ever unknown."

Nothing can be more horrible than the idea of thus reducing assassination to a system; and, even setting humanity and morality entirely aside, nothing could be more ill judged. It drove the Spaniards to despair, and furnished them, at the same time, with an excuse for any atrocities which they chose to commit. It discredited the cause of the Revolution, and prevented a number of respectable Creoles from espousing it. Allende himself, is said to have been so disgusted with the cruelty of his chief, that nothing but the approach of Calleja prevented him from abandoning him.

The cannon which the Insurgents had found at



San Blas, were so numerous, that Hidalgo, though there were only 1,200 muskets in the whole army, imagined that, with the assistance of his batteries, he should be able to repulse Calleja's forces. Allende foresaw that the want of discipline amongst the troops, would produce the same effect as at Aculco, and wished not to try another action; but being out-voted, in a council of war, he was forced to submit. The bridge of Căldērōn, (about sixteen leagues from Guădălăjără,) was fortified, and the Mexicans awaited there the approach of the Royalist army.

Calleja, after having passed nearly six weeks in Guănăxūătō, began his march towards the North; and on the 16th of January, 1811, the two armies were, once more, in sight. On the 17th, a general action took place, the event of which completely justified Allende's predictions. After some partial successes, on the part of the Mexicans, who repulsed two or three attacks, in one of which the Conde de la Cadena (Calleja's second in command) was killed; the explosion of an ammunition-waggon threw the whole army into confusion; but, as they had fought better, so they lost fewer men than at Aculco. Hidalgo and Allende effected an orderly retreat, in the direction of the Provincias Internas. Răyōn returned to Guădălăjără, to carry off the military chest, which contained 300,000 dollars. This he effected, as Calleja, satisfied with his victory, did not attempt to pursue the Insurgents, or even to enter Guada-

laxara, until four days after the battle. It is from the bridge of Căldērōn, where this action was fought, that he takes the title of Conde de Căldērōn; under which, in the year 1820, in Spain, he was surprised and made prisoner by Riego, in the midst of the army which he was destined to lead to Mexico, in order to terminate the work, which he had commenced ten years before.

The Insurgent Chiefs arrived in safety at Săltillō, with about 4000 men. There it was determined that Rayon should be left in command of the troops, while Hídălgō, Ăllēndě, Ăldămă, and Ăbăsōlō, pushed on, with an escort, for the frontiers of the United States, where they intended to purchase arms and military stores, with a part of the treasure which they had saved. They were surprised, on the road, by the treachery of a former associate, Don Ignacio Ēlizōndō, who, having declared, at first, for the Revolution, was anxious to make his peace with the Government, by so valuable a capture. They were made prisoners on the 21st of March, 1811, and conveyed to Chihūahuă, where, such was the anxiety of the Government to draw from them some information as to the ramifications of the Insurrection, in the different provinces, that their trial was protracted until the end of July; when Hidalgo, having been previously degraded, was shot. His companions shared the same fate: they all appear to have met death with great firmness; at least, I have heard even Spaniards allow that the accounts



published at the time, of their confessions, and alleged penitence, were fabrications.

It is not my intention to follow the history of the Revolution, after Hidalgo's death, through all the mazes of a Guerrilla war. Throughout the whole territory of Mexico, from Veracruz to the Provincias Internas of the North, Insurgent parties were organized, and the Royalist troops employed in their pursuit. But there was no concert amongst their leaders, many of whom were barbarous and illiterate men, while each considered himself as independent in his own particular district. Răyōn assumed the command of the remains of Hidalgo's forces at Saltillo, and retreated with them upon Zăcătēcās; but his authority was acknowledged by none but his own men. The Baxio was laid under contribution by the parties of Muñiz, and the Padre Nāvārrētē: Sėrrānō and Ōsōrnō commanded in the Provinces of La Puebla, and Veracruz; and even the valley of Mexico swarmed to such a degree with partizans, that all communication between the Capital and the Interior was cut off, while sentinels were *lassoed*\* at the very gates of the town. But still the authority of the Viceroy was acknowledged in all the principal cities, and the Creoles were unable to assemble

\* The lasso, respecting which the works of Captain Hall, and Captain Head, contain so many amusing particulars, is as generally used in Mexico, as in Chile, or the Pampas, and that, not merely in catching horses, or cattle, but as an offensive weapon.

any force that could meet the army of Calleja in the field. Little, therefore, was done towards bringing the contest to a close, although the country was devastated, and hardly a day passed without some partial action being fought.

Răyōn seems to have been the first to perceive that nothing but a general coalition could enable his countrymen to contend with an enemy, who had the power of directing an overwhelming force upon any particular point, and thus destroying its opponents in detail. To effect this, he conceived the idea of a National Junta, to be created by some sort of popular election, and acknowledged by all the Insurgent chiefs; and he selected the town of Zītăcūārō, in the State of Valladolid, as the best residence for such an assembly; public opinion having pronounced itself more decidedly in favour of the Insurgents in that Province, than in any other.

With this view he occupied Zītăcūārō, about the end of May, (1811,) and having repulsed an attack made upon it, on the 22nd of June, by Brigadier Ęmpārān, at the head of 2000 men, he proceeded in the execution of his favourite plan, in which he was so far successful, that, on the 10th of September 1811, a Junta, or Central Government, was installed, composed of five members, elected by as large an assembly of the most respectable farmers, and landed proprietors of the district, as could be collected for the occasion, in conjunction with the Ayuntamiento, and inhabitants of the town.



The principles laid down by the New Junta, in its first declarations, seem to have formed the basis of those adopted by Iturbide, ten years later, in his famous plan of Iguälä: both, at least, agree in acknowledging Ferdinand VII. as Sovereign of Mexico, provided he would quit his European dominions, and occupy the throne in person, and both profess to desire a most intimate union with Spain. But there can have been but little sincerity in this, on the part of the Junta, for Mörölös, with whom, at that time, Rayon had held but little communication, but whose name was, soon afterwards, added to those of the other members of the Government, openly blamed his colleagues for consenting to recognize a Spanish Monarch on *any terms*; while Rayon only defended the measure on the score of expediency, "because the name of King still possessed such influence over the lower classes, that it was highly desirable to afford them the means of continuing in a state of insurrection, without shocking, in any way, their notions of what their duty to their Sovereign required."\*

The intelligence of the installation of the Junta of Zitácuarö was received, with great enthusiasm, by the Creoles throughout New Spain; but the flattering hopes which this event excited, were, unfortunately, never realized. There was not,

\* Vide Original Letters, since published by Bustamante, in his Cuadro, and Representation of Audiencia, Appendix.

indeed, any want of good intentions, on the part of the Junta; but the supremacy of its members was not, at first, generally acknowledged; and when, by the accession of Morelos, they acquired additional influence, the destruction of their residence by Cällējä, and the preparations for the Congress of Chülpänzingö, in which the Junta, itself, was, finally, merged, prevented any decisive measures from being taken. It left, however, some lasting memorials of its existence. I know few papers drawn up with greater moderation, or better calculated to produce a good, practical effect, than the Manifesto, with the proposals for Peace, or War, which was transmitted, in the name of the Junta, to the Viceroy, in the month of March, 1812.

After an eloquent picture of the state, to which fifteen months of civil war had reduced the country, and an appeal to the Viceroy, respecting the manner in which the miseries inseparable from any state of warfare, had been augmented by the wanton sacrifice of the prisoners, Dr. Cos (by whom this manifesto was drawn up) proceeds to point out to Venegas his critical position; the little dependence which he could place upon the Creole troops, who, sooner or later, must make common cause with their countrymen;—the rapid progress of the Revolution, and the total inefficacy of all the measures of severity, by which he had endeavoured to check it. He then assumes, as undeniable principles, the



natural equality of America and Spain; the right of America to assemble her Cortes, as the Spaniards had done theirs; and the nullity of the claims of any body of men in the Peninsula, to exercise the supreme authority in Mexico, during the captivity of the Sovereign: and finally, he proposes, on the part of the Junta, that, "if the Europeans will consent to give up the offices which they hold, and to allow a General Congress to be assembled, their persons and properties shall be religiously respected; their salaries paid; and the same privileges granted to them, as to the native Mexicans; who, on their side, will acknowledge Ferdinand as their Sovereign; assist the Peninsula with their treasures; and regard all Spaniards as their fellow-subjects, and citizens of the same great empire."

Such was the plan of Peace. The plan of War was confined, principally, to an endeavour to obtain some abatement of severity in the treatment of prisoners, so as to avoid unnecessary effusion of blood; and to establish the severest penalties for all such, on either side, as should sack or burn villages, where no resistance was made; or authorize indiscriminate massacres, on entering the smaller towns.

The introduction of the name of religion, in a quarrel where religion was in no way concerned, is, likewise, reprobated in very strong terms; but, in the whole course of the manifesto, there is not one offensive or insulting expression; an instance of

moderation which is the more remarkable, as, at that time, the cause of the Revolution appeared to be every where triumphant.

These proposals Venegas ordered to be burnt by the public executioner, in the Plaza Mayor of Mexico! He could not, however, prevent them from producing a great effect upon the public mind, enforced, as they were, by the example and success of Mörēlōs, whose career it will now be my duty to trace, as furnishing one of the most interesting episodes in the Mexican Revolution.

We left Morelos, in October, 1810, setting out from Valladolid, with a commission from Hidalgo to act as Captain-general of the provinces on the South-Western coast, without any other retinue than a few servants, from his own curacy, armed with six muskets, and some old lances. The first addition which he received to this force, on arriving on the coast, was a numerous band of slaves from Pětālāñ, and other towns, eager to purchase their liberty on the field of battle: arms were, however, so scarce, that twenty muskets, which were discovered in Pětālāñ, were considered as a most invaluable acquisition. The brothers, Don José, and Don Antonio, Gälēāñā, who had already declared for the cause of Independence, joined him, soon afterwards, with their adherents, (November, 1810,) and increased his numbers to about a thousand men. With this force Morelos advanced upon Acapulco. He was met by the Commandant



of the district, Don Francisco Paris, at the head of a numerous and well-appointed body of troops. Notwithstanding his superiority, Morelos, aware of the necessity of commencing his operations by a *coup-d'éclat*, determined to attack the camp of the Royalists by night. The attempt was crowned with complete success. On the 25th of January, 1811, the enemy was surprised, and thrown into such confusion at the first onset, that they thought of nothing but a rapid flight. Eight hundred muskets, five pieces of artillery, a quantity of ammunition, and a considerable sum of money, fell into the hands of Mōrēlōs, who thus saw all his wants supplied at once. Seven hundred prisoners were taken at the same time, all of whom were treated with the greatest humanity. This successful enterprize was, as Mōrēlōs himself frequently said, the corner-stone of all his later triumphs. The rapidity of his progress, from this moment, was astonishing; and the skill with which he baffled the efforts of the divisions successively detached against him by Venegas, under the Brigadiers Llānō and Fuentēs, rendered him, in a very short time, the terror of the Spaniards, and the admiration of his own countrymen. His celebrity brought men of talent, from every quarter, to his standard. Those in whom he placed most confidence were, Don Ermenegildo Gālēānā, the Cura Mātāmōrōs, (whom he appointed his first lieutenant,) and the Brāvōs, whose whole family joined him, soon after the defeat

of Paris. The father, Don Lēōnārdō, and one of his brothers, perished in the course of the Revolution; but Don Nicolas Brāvō (the son) survived it, and has been placed, by the unanimous voice of his countrymen, with Vīctōriā, at the head of the present government.

The whole of the year 1811 was occupied by a series of petty engagements, (the details of which can only be interesting to Mexicans,) and by the strenuous efforts of Morelos to introduce something like discipline amongst the Blacks, who had enlisted in considerable numbers in his army. Their ferocity was of use in the field of battle, but it was only by frequent examples that it could be prevented from showing itself on other occasions; and it required all the firmness of Morelos to keep it within any bounds.

In the mean time, the scene of action had been, gradually, brought nearer to the Capital; and, in January 1812, the Insurgents advanced so far, that Tasco, a town famous for its mines, and only twenty-five leagues from Mexico, was taken by Gālēānā and Brāvō, after an obstinate resistance.

Various actions took place in January, and the beginning of February, 1812, in all of which Mōrēlōs was victorious; so that, at last, his advanced-guard, under Bravo, pushed on to Chalco, with outposts at San Aūgūstīn de las Cūevās, within three leagues of the gates of Mexico. But the alarm which this movement excited drew upon Morelos a



more formidable opponent. Calleja was summoned to defend the Capital, with the army which had triumphed over the first Insurgents at Ācūlcō, and the bridge of Cāldērōn; but, though flushed with new successes, Morelos determined to wait its approach. Cuāutlā Āmīlpās, (about twenty-two leagues from Mexico,) was the place which he selected to make his stand. It was an entirely open town, nor did he attempt to supply the want of exterior fortifications, though he was indefatigable in his endeavours to render the interior as strong as possible, by cutting trenches in the streets, walling up the doors, and lower windows of the houses, and breaking a communication within, so as to give his men every possible advantage. In this he was seconded by the activity of his Lieutenants, Brāvō, Gālēānā, and the Cura Mātāmōrōs; and such was the confidence with which they inspired their troops, that the approach of the Royal army was impatiently expected.

As Calleja, whom we left in the North of the country, did not march from thence to Cuāutlā, without adding to the number of his successes over the Insurgents, it will be necessary, in order to avoid confusion, to trace his progress, before I give any account of the siege.

From the moment of its establishment, the Junta of Zītācūārō was considered by the Spaniards as their most formidable enemy; and Venegas, in December 1811, sent positive orders to Calleja, then at

Acāmbārō, in the province of Mīhōācān, to march, with all his forces, against the town. Calleja obeyed; and his army sustained such hardships, and overcame such difficulties on the way, in crossing a country where roads were unknown, and where, at times, they were forced to cut their way through forests so thick, that it required the labour of twenty-four hours to enable them to advance a single league, that even their enemies speak of the undertaking with admiration.

On the 1st of January, 1812, Cālējā arrived before Zītācūārō; and on the 2nd, he attacked, and carried the town by assault, which must have been badly defended, as, from the strength of its situation, it was capable of making considerable resistance. The Junta escaped to Sūltēpec, where it established a new seat of Government; but the honour of having been selected for its first residence proved fatal to Zītācūārō. Calleja, after having passed a fortnight there, which he employed principally in examining Rayon's papers, decimated the inhabitants, ordered the walls to be rased, and burnt the town on his departure, sparing only the churches and convents.\*

From Zītācūārō, he proceeded, by forced marches, to Mexico, where Venegas most anxiously expected him, in order to check the progress of Morelos. The army made a triumphal entry into the Capital, on

\* I saw this unfortunate town in 1826. The situation is lovely, but the place is still in ruins.



spot; an action, which contributed, not a little, to raise the spirits of his own men. Indeed, nothing could exceed the enthusiasm with which Morelos had inspired both his troops, and the inhabitants of the town. The Indians, who were stationed upon the flat roofs of the houses, did great execution with their slings, and assisted in preventing the enemy, when once thrown into disorder, from forming again. Morelos himself was equally successful with Galeana in repulsing the column which attacked the Plaza de St. Domingo, where he commanded in person. The action lasted from seven in the morning till three in the afternoon; when Calleja, after a fruitless attempt to decoy the Mexicans from their entrenchments, by pretending to abandon his artillery, drew off his men, (leaving five hundred dead upon the spot,) and retired, in good order, to a little village, about a league from the town, where he established his head-quarters.

The event of the day had so completely discouraged him, that he did not think of risking another assault, but determined to lay siege to Cuāutlā in form, and wrote to Venegas for supplies of artillery, ammunition, and men. Venegas immediately sent him all that the magazines of the Capital contained; and ordered Brigadier Llano, who had before been opposed to Morelos, to join the army of the Centre with his whole division. The courier charged with the Viceroy's dispatches having fallen into the hands of an Insurgent party, Morelos was perfectly aware

of the increase of force, which Calleja was about to receive; but he felt, likewise, that the eyes of all Mexico were turned upon the contest at Cuāutlā, and that a retreat would defeat the hopes, which the repulse of the Royalists, in their first attack, had excited. He determined, therefore, to defend himself to the last, in a place where, according to the rules of war, defence was impossible; and this resolution was most gallantly carried into effect.

Llano was, at this time, engaged in an attack upon Īzūcār, which was successfully defended by Don Vicente Güerrērō, who had, at that time, begun his long and perilous career. In the course of the Revolution, this general had received upwards of fifty wounds, and has had almost as many miraculous escapes: one of the most extraordinary, perhaps, was at Īzūcār, where, while he was asleep, exhausted with fatigue, a small shell came through the roof, and rolled under his bed, where it exploded, and killed, or wounded, every person in the room, but himself.

On the receipt of the Viceroy's orders, Llano quitted Īzūcār, and joined Cällējā on the 1st of March. On the 4th, Calleja on one side, and Llano on the other, began to cannonade, and bombard the town, after having erected batteries and breastworks in the course of a single night.

The first shells alarmed the inhabitants excessively; but, within twenty-four hours, they grew so accustomed to them, that the very children were



employed in collecting them, as well as the cannon, and musket-balls which were strewed about the streets; for which Morelos, whose stock of ammunition was not very copious, paid them so much a dozen.

Hostilities were not, however, confined to this distant warfare: during the month of March, an attempt was made to surprise Calleja, by an insurgent division not in Cuautla, under the orders of one of the Bravos, and Larios, which failed completely. The want of water, too, constantly brought the troops, on both sides, to close quarters. Cuautla was supplied by a stream, which, at a point not very far from the town, there was a possibility of turning into another channel. This Calleja effected; and, though his works were destroyed by a sally from the town, he had made some progress in re-establishing them, when Galeana, aware of the necessity of securing this important spot, undertook, on the night of the 25th of March, to dislodge the enemy, and to raise a fort close to the spring. This enterprise was conducted with such activity and judgment, that it was crowned with complete success. In the course of twenty-four hours, a fort, with three pieces of artillery, was completed, with a covered way, which extended to the town. Galeana himself took charge of the new fortification, and defended it against a desperate attack, which the Royalists made upon it the following night, and in which their loss was considerable, as Ga-

leana would not allow his men to fire, until the enemy was within pistol-shot of the entrenchments.

An attempt to enter Cuautla, by establishing a correspondence with some of the inhabitants, likewise failed. Calleja had managed to induce a Captain Manso, to promise to deliver up a battery entrusted to his charge, but his treachery was discovered by Galeana, and turned against the Royalists, who, on seeing the signals agreed upon, advanced, by night, and were introduced by Galeana himself into the trenches, where they were received with so general, and so well-directed a discharge, that they left one hundred men dead upon the spot.

Calleja's own reports do ample justice to the gallantry of the defence made by the Insurgents. He acknowledges, (March 25th) in his correspondence with the Viceroy, that, so far from having shown any symptoms of discouragement, they had supported both the firing and the bombardment, "with a firmness worthy of a better cause;" and that they continued to harass his troops by frequent sallies, which kept them constantly upon the alert. He calls Morelos, "a second Mahomet;" and though he terms fanaticism the enthusiasm with which he had inspired his followers, he confesses that it had produced the most extraordinary effects. At a much earlier period, he had applied for a train of heavy artillery from Përôtë; but though Venegas instantly despatched the necessary